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 Health care markets in the US are increasingly characterized and dominated by large, integrated 
health systems. Hospitals have particularly targeted primary care practices for acquisition to form 
vertically integrated health systems. Proponents of vertical integration in health care have long touted its 
promise of leading to reduced costs and improved quality. These outcomes could occur as a result of the 
improved care coordination, deduplication of services, economies of scale, and standardization of best 
practices that might be afforded by vertical integration between hospitals and primary care practices. On 
the other hand, integration may be driven by other strategic motivations such as securing a referral base 
for the hospital, depriving rival hospitals of referrals, increasing leverage with insurers, and/or to 
generally gain more market power. Despite the promise, the evidence to date on whether vertical 
integration changes care delivery and associated outcomes is limited and mixed. To fill critical gaps in 
knowledge, I examine the impact of primary care vertical integration on outcomes for Medicare 
beneficiaries. In Aim 1, I study the effect of vertical integration on spending and utilization for Medicare 
fee-for-service beneficiaries. In Aim 2, I study the effect of vertical integration on quality of care for 
Medicare beneficiaries. And in Aim 3, I study whether the effects of vertical integration vary depending 
on practice characteristics. Across these Aims, I found that the vertical integration of primary care 
practices led to increased Medicare spending per beneficiary, driven largely by shifting utilization 
patterns toward hospital-based and away from physician office-based services. The spending increases 
were met with no meaningful improvements in quality of care. These effects did not vary by practice   
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characteristics, with one exception: there were no spending increases among practices located in rural 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 Health care delivery markets in the United States are increasingly characterized by large, 
consolidated health systems. Over 80% of hospital markets exceed the threshold of what the Federal 
Trade Commission considers to be “highly concentrated”.1 Two thirds of hospitals were part of a larger 
health system in 2017, an increase from 53% in 2005.2 In the physician market, physicians are 
increasingly moving away from solo practice towards employment in medical groups or health systems. 
For the first time in 2018 physicians were more likely to be employees than owners of their practices.3 
Physicians are increasingly moving away from solo practice, both integrating horizontally to form large 
medical groups4 and vertically integrating with hospitals and health systems5. 
The trends in vertical integration (VI) are particularly stark in primary care as these practices 
shoulder a central role in new care delivery models, such as the patient-centered medical home, 
accountable care organizations, and initiatives supported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (e.g., the Comprehensive Primary Care and Primary Care First programs). These new delivery 
and payment models require new care capabilities which may depend on financial and operational 
resources, to the extent that such capabilities do not already exist in the practices. Independent practices 
lacking the resources needed to succeed in such models may seek to join a larger health system as one 
method to gain access to the necessary capital and infrastructure to change care delivery. Hospitals may 
seek VI with physician practices as a way to gain leverage with insurers, as a way to gain market power 
primarily through securing a source for additional referrals, and/or as a way to enhance care capabilities 
for their patients. Many proponents believe integration could lead to reduced costs and improved quality 
primarily through achieving economies of scale, better ability to coordinate care, and standardizing best 
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practices in care delivery. However, a tension exists between VI potentially leading to improved care for 
patients and pursuing integration for market power purposes alone. 
 While the promise of VI is well-documented6,7, the extent to which it affects cost and quality is an 
open empirical question. Findings from previous studies on the effect of VI on cost and quality outcomes 
have been mixed.6,8,9 Given the trends in increasing integration and formation of large health systems, it is 
critical to understand how changes in ownership affect care delivery patterns, the extent to which patients 
benefit from receiving care in these new organizations, and which types of organizational forms deliver 
the greatest improvements in outcomes. 
1.2 Significance 
 Integrated provider organizations represent the new normal for health care delivery as physicians 
are increasingly integrating with each other and with health care systems. The proportion of physicians 
owning their practice decreased from 53% in 2012 to 45% in 2018.3 Hospitals doubled their acquisition of 
primary care practices from 2007 to 2017.10 Increasing rates of both horizontal and vertical integration 
resulted in a 29% increase in market concentration among primary care practices from 2007 to 2017, the 
highest rate of change in any healthcare sector over that period.10 As of 2018 about 41% of primary care 
physicians were employed by health sytems.11 There was substantial geographic variation in employment 
in health systems, with about one third of metropolitan statistical areas having more than half of their 
physicians employed by health systems.12 Of principal concern to policymakers is whether increasing 
consolidation reduces competition and increases health systems’ market power. There is a substantial 
body of evidence demonstrating that both horizontal integration (especially hospital mergers) and vertical 
integration leads to reduced competition and large increases in prices as systems use their leverage in 
negotiations with insurers.8,13 
 While the market power concerns related to consolidation are well-documented, whether primary 
care vertical integration leads to improved care for patients remains an open question. The body of 
literature related to VI is much smaller than that of horizontal integration and hospital mergers in 
particular. The existing research on VI reveals mixed findings, as noted by several recent systematic 
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reviews.8,9 One systematic review rated the quality of previous research and found that, of 24 studies 
related to the effect of VI on cost or quality outcomes, 21 were considered low or very low quality and 
only 3 were considered moderate quality.9 Most studies used cross-sectional designs or inadequately 
addressed selection bias and other confounders, thus precluding causal inference on how changes in 
practice ownership affect outcomes. Only 4 studies used a more rigorous panel data design, though these 
studies were limited to: a small number of practices responding to a survey at two time points14, an 
analysis of 27 particular acquisitions of various specialties15, 12 clinics in a single health care market16, or 
a small number of states17. Only one of these four studies focused on the vertical integration of primary 
care practices in particular, focusing on a commercially-insured patient population.17 
 Medicare is the single largest payer for healthcare services in the United States, accounting for 
about 23% of all spending on personal health care in the United States.18 Medicare plays a major role in 
setting prices for services through its payment systems (e.g., the physician fee schedule), including 
potentially incentivizing vertical integration.19 When a physician practice is purchased by a hospital, they 
can bill Medicare for an additional “facility fee” on top of the professional fee. This effectively results in 
a unit price change for physician evaluation and management (E&M) services, and translates to Medicare 
spending roughly twice as much on these services than it otherwise would if they were delivered in an 
independent office setting. Unlike in the commercially-insured population, there is no other direct 
negotiation mechanisms for the vertically integrated systems to receive higher payments from Medicare. 
This allows studies of vertical integration in Medicare to isolate changes in spending resulting from 
changes in utilization, rather than simultaneously dealing with increases in prices. Thus, Medicare 
beneficiaries comprise a critically important population to study in general and perfectly suited to the 
study of how vertical integration affects care delivery. 
1.3 Study Overview 
 The purpose of this study is to examine how VI of primary care practices affects patients. I focus 
specifically on how primary care practice vertical integration affects spending, utilization, and quality of 
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care outcomes for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. To do so, I study the following three specific 
aims: 
Aim 1: Estimate the effect of primary care practice vertical integration on spending and 
utilization for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. The central hypothesis in this aim is 
that primary care practice VI will lead to reduced spending per beneficiary through 
reductions in utilization. 
Aim 2: Estimate the effect of primary care practice VI on quality of care for Medicare 
fee-for-service beneficiaries. The central hypothesis in this aim is that primary care 
practice VI will lead to increased quality of care specifically for measures related to care 
coordination and primary care quality. 
Aim 3: Identify the degree of heterogeneity in the effect of primary care practice VI on 
outcomes by practice size, horizontal ownership of practices, rural practice location, and 
participation in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). The central hypotheses 
for this aim are that VI effects will be moderated by practice size, horizontal ownership, 
rural practice location, and MSSP participation. 
 The findings from this study will have important policy and practice implications, as new health 
care delivery organizations drive patients’ use of services and impact health outcomes. This study will 
produce empirical evidence on how VI effects care delivery patterns and quality of care. The findings will 
have implications for healthcare spending growth in the Medicare program, and whether any changes in 
spending result in improvements in quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries. Such evidence will be 
critical for guiding healthcare payment and delivery policies aimed at incentivizing the most beneficial 
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CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECT OF PRIMARY CARE PRACTICE VERTICAL INTEGRATION ON 
SPENDING AND UTILIZATION FOR MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE BENEFICIARIES 
2.1 Introduction 
 Physicians are now more likely to be employees rather than owners of their practices, decreasing 
from 53.2% of physicians owning their practice in 2012 to 45.9% in 2018.1 This change represents a shift 
away from solo practice and towards integrating with large medical groups and health systems.1 The 
trends in integration are particularly stark in primary care as these practices shoulder a central role in new 
care delivery models, such as patient-centered medical homes, accountable care organizations, and other 
programs supported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (e.g., the Comprehensive Primary 
Care Initiative). One goal of these new care delivery models is to improve patient outcomes by adopting 
advanced practice capabilities (e.g. advanced use of health information technology, population health 
management) under the assumption that such capabilities are required to improve care and reduce costs. 
These capabilities may require substantial financial and operational investments that independent primary 
care practices may not be able to afford themselves. Vertical integration (VI), or the acquisition of 
primary care practices by hospitals, provides one way for practices to gain access to the necessary capital 
and infrastructure.2 While vertical integration has occurred for decades in the United States3, primary care 
physicians have experienced increasing rates of ownership changes. Over the period 2010-2016, the 
proportion of primary care physicians working in vertically integrated organizations increased by 57% 
(from 28% to 44% over that period).4 
 The promise of VI in health care is well-described.5-7 Many stakeholders believe VI will lead to 
reduced costs and improved quality of care primarily through improved care coordination, better use of 
health information technology, standardization of best practices, deduplication of services, economies of 
scale, and reduced administrative burden for physicians. On the other hand, VI may serve as a vehicle for 
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health systems to increase market power and leverage with insurers. In this case, VI may be 
anticompetitive and may not necessarily lead to efficiencies or improvement in patient outcomes.8,9 
 Despite the promise, the evidence on the extent to which VI affects patient outcomes is an open 
empirical question. Findings from previous studies on the effect of VI on patient outcomes are mixed.5,9,10 
Given trends in VI, it is critical to understand how changes in primary care practice ownership affect 
patient outcomes. The goal of this study is to estimate the effect of primary care practice VI on spending 
and utilization for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Overview of relevant theoretical literature 
 In this section, I briefly review the literature related to the general motivating theories of VI. For 
a more thorough summary, the reader should refer to a review by Post and colleagues.9 
Vertical integration occurs when one firm becomes an owner of another firm at a different level 
in the vertical chain of production.11 For example, a hospital (the downstream firm) purchases a physician 
practice (the upstream firm) as a source of a key input (patient referrals). There are several theoretical 
reasons why these two firms may vertically integrate. These theories can be conceptualized as efficiency- 
or strategy-based motivators.9 
 Firms may seek VI to correct inefficiencies in market-based exchange. These efficiency-based 
motivators may manifest in several ways. First, firms may wish to capture forgone revenues in production 
created by operating independently (known as vertical externalities). Ownership allows the vertically 
integrated firm to account for costs and prices of goods produced across the vertical chain to increase 
joint profits above what they would have received when operating independently.12 This includes double 
marginalization such that the upstream firm prices goods above its marginal cost, the downstream firm 
adds a markup so that it can sell above its marginal cost after accounting for the upstream market, 
resulting in inefficient pricing of the final good above a price that jointly maximizes profits. Second, firms 
may seek to resolve agency issues in aligning incentives across firms and to overcome information 
asymmetries related to monitoring performance of the other firm. Ownership can be a powerful tool to 
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unify the goals of the firms by exerting influence on how employees behave.13 Third, firms may seek to 
reduce transaction costs, which refer to the costs of exchange when operating independently. These costs 
generally result from incomplete contracting due to bounded rationality, difficulty in specifying and 
measuring performance, and the inability to account for all potential contingencies.11 Vertical integration 
is one way to internalize these costs in joint production, particularly when there are relationship-specific 
assets between firms (e.g., dedicated assets for a particular firm, skills and expertise in a particular firm).11  
Firms may also pursue VI for strategic purposes, which generally relate to gaining a competitive 
advantage and increasing market power. First, firms may seek to leverage certain capabilities that cannot 
easily be shared across firm boundaries, such as particularly innovative processes or management 
competencies. Ownership internalizes these capabilities and increases the competitive advantage of the 
vertically integrated firm. Second, firms may seek vertical foreclosure which refers to a way of gaining 
market power by denying or raising the cost of key inputs for rival firms. For example, a downstream firm 
may purchase an upstream firm to gain exclusive control over key inputs, thus preventing rival firms from 
accessing those inputs (such as in the example of a hospital purchasing a physician practice to gain 
control of patient referrals). Finally, firms may integrate to achieve horizontal market power by reducing 
competition between the upstream and downstream firms. Reducing competition directly increases market 
concentration and thus market power of the newly integrated firm. 
2.2.2 Vertical integration of hospitals and physicians: The rationale 
Hospitals (the downstream firm) and physician practices (the upstream firm) may pursue VI for a 
variety of reasons. First, general pressure from external forces such as payment models from insurers 
(e.g., total cost of care contracting, value-based payments) may drive and hospitals practices to seek VI. 
They may seek opportunities for enhanced profitability such as by capturing site-specific revenues in the 
case of hospital-outpatient department billing differentials, aligning incentives to pursue risk-based 
contracting, and improving care coordination during patient care transitions. Physician practices in 
particular may seek the capital and infrastructure of a larger health care system to provide administrative 
and technical support both in providing care and in negotiating with insurers. In terms of strategy, 
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practices and hospitals may wish to adapt new care delivery processes, increase market power14 and 
leverage with insurers,15 and/or increase patient referrals to the owning hospital2. Moreover, hospitals and 
physicians could pursue vertical integration for any combination of these efficiency- or strategy-based 
purposes. 
 Depending on the dominant motivation for pursuing VI, there could be a range of mechanisms 
through which VI affects spending and utilization outcomes for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. 
Hospitals and practices may simply wish to increase revenues from hospital outpatient department 
(HOPD) billing without any other change to behavior. This would result in a revenue increase, holding all 
other behaviors constant. Hospitals and primary care practices may improve care coordination and 
deduplication of services through the use of a shared electronic health record system and other health 
information technology capabilities. Care coordination and deduplication could lead to reduced spending 
if there is a consequential reduction in utilization. Practices and hospitals may develop new care delivery 
capabilities, such as care management processes and performance reporting that may or may not impact 
spending and utilization. If pursued solely for leverage with private insurers, there may be no change in 
care delivery behavior and thus no effects on Medicare spending or utilization. There are also potential 
negative consequences of VI, such as loss of physician autonomy resulting in diminished quality of care, 
complex organizational structure and governance leading to increased cost of communication and 
coordination, reduced organizational agility to respond to changes in the external market, and over-use of 
expensive inputs.5 Each of these negative factors has the potential to reduce efficiency. 
 Owing to both the differences in motivation for pursuing VI, coupled with the potential for 
positive and/or negative effects of integration, the theoretical relationship between VI and spending and 
utilization outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries is ambiguous and thus an empirical issue.8,9 
2.2.3 Vertical integration of hospitals and physicians: The empirical evidence 
 Despite the importance of vertical integration in health care, the evidence to date is relatively 
thin. There have been a number of studies on horizontal integration and consolidation, particularly among 
hospitals.5,16 Much less is known about the integration of physicians and hospitals in general and even less 
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about the integration of primary care physicians and hospitals in particular. These gaps have been noted in 
several systematic reviews of the literature, and where there are existing studies, these reviews have noted 
inconsistencies in the results driven by low study quality.9,10 For example, of the 19 studies in a recent 
systematic review that examined the effect of vertical integration on spending or utilization measures, 14 
were considered low or very low quality and only 5 were considered of moderate quality by the review 
authors.10 Quality issues were primarily related to cross-sectional study designs, inadequate accounting 
for confounders, and/or varying patient populations (e.g., some studies focusing on commercially-insured, 
others on Medicare).  
Two of the highest quality studies to date focusing on spending and utilization for Medicare 
beneficiaries have examined the effect of VI of physicians and hospitals using longitudinal study designs. 
The first, by Koch and colleagues, examines the effect of VI on Medicare spending and utilization for 27 
particular specialty and primary care physician group acquisitions over the period 2005-2010.17 Using a 
difference-in-differences design, the authors estimate two-way fixed effects models at the physician-, 
group- and hospital-levels to assess changes in claims billed, clinical visits, and Medicare spending 
following hospitals’ acquisition of the physician groups. They find that acquisition resulted in a 70% 
reduction in office-based claims billed and a 53% increase in hospital-based claims, corresponding to a 
76% reduction in office-based spending, 46% increase in hospital-based spending, and an 18% net 
spending increase. The second study, by Baker and colleagues, combines practice data from the National 
Study of Small and Medium-Sized Physician Practices collected at two time points (between 2007-2009 
and again 5 years later) with Medicare claims to assess how changes in reported practice ownership from 
time period 1 to time period 2 affects Medicare spending.18 Using Medicare beneficiary-level regression 
models controlling for practice fixed effects, time fixed effects, and practice- and beneficiary-level 
covariates, the authors did not find a statistically significant association between changes in practice 
ownership and spending. 
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2.2.4 New contribution 
The current study builds on these previous studies in several key ways. First, this study includes 
longitudinal data on nearly the universe of primary care practices in the US. The two previous studies 
were limited to a small number of physician groups17 and practices18 of varying specialties. While those 
studies provide general evidence on the effects of physician-hospital integration, this study provides direct 
evidence on how VI affects primary care practices specifically. Second, I leverage a novel dataset on all 
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries linked to their primary care practices, allowing me to account for a 
robust set of beneficiary and practice characteristics in the analyses. The previous study by Koch and 
colleagues did not consider patient characteristics which could account for some variation in spending and 
utilization measures. Third, this study considers vertical integration over the period 2012-2017. The 
previous studies considered the effects of VI through 2012, so this study represents a more contemporary 
assessment of health care markets following health care reform of the Affordable Care Act.  
2.2.5 Conceptual framework 
When operating independently, hospitals and physicians each have their own utility functions. 
Hospitals (through management) choose inputs to maximize the utility they get from profit, quantity of 
care, and quality of care.19,20 Physicians choose inputs to maximize the utility they get from income, 
leisure, and patient outcomes.21,22 Joint ownership affects the utility functions directly through the choice 
of inputs to maximize utility across firms as well as through changes in budget constraints. Joining the 
utility functions means both parties share resources (e.g., finances, health information technology, staff, 
administrative support) and now have a stake in the outcomes across settings. Ownership also means the 
owning firm can exert some degree of influence on clinical, operational, and financial processes.13,23 
In the Medicare setting, fee-for-service payment forms the chassis for provider care delivery 
behavior. Changes in profit resulting from VI in this setting would not come from changes in unit costs or 
prices other than through the opportunity to bill for an additional facility fee for primary care services. 
Instead, the underlying incentive would be to increase service volume, shift care to higher-reimbursed 
settings (e.g., from physician office to hospital outpatient department billing), and/or to order more 
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expensive diagnostic tests.2,9 Whether and to what extent provider behavior deviates from these 
underlying incentives depends in part on the efficiency- and/or strategy-enhancing motivators for 
pursuing VI. Changes in the observed outcomes may also depend on the composition of a practice’s 
patients, practice structural capabilities (e.g. staffing) and characteristics (e.g., culture, management), 
whether a practice participates in value-based contracting such as an accountable care organization, and 
structure of the local health care delivery and payment systems.9  
2.3 Methods 
To study the effect of changes in primary care practice ownership on spending and utilization 
outcomes, I used longitudinal data on primary care practices linked to their Medicare patients over the 
period 2012 to 2017. All data for this study were derived from the Dartmouth Comparative Health System 
Performance Initiative Center of Excellence, funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality.24 
2.3.1 Data 
 This analysis relied on three data sources. First, I used 100% Medicare claims files in each 
calendar year. This includes all final-action claims for Parts A and B services rendered in a given year. 
The individual claims were aggregated to create a beneficiary-level file for each calendar year. This file 
consists of annual measures on spending and use (e.g., total Medicare spending, number of ED visits, etc.) 
as well as beneficiary demographics and chronic conditions. 
Second, provider and practice characteristics were derived from the IQVIA OneKey database. 
The OneKey file is a proprietary commercial database containing characteristics of providers and health 
care organizations in the US. IQVIA uses a large number of data sources to continuously update their 
roster of providers and organizations, including the AMA Physician Masterfile, National Provider 
Identifier database, state licensing boards, association and trade publications, as well as web searches and 
direct outreach to practices to verify and collect data. The OneKey database combines data formerly 
known as the IMS Healthcare Relational Services (HCRS) suite of databases and the SK&A Healthcare 
databases.25 These data are believed to contain the near universe of providers26, and have been used in a 
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variety of studies related to changes in practice ownership17,27-30 and practice size/composition31-33. In 
addition, the OneKey files have been used to construct research datasets, including being used as the 
sampling frame for the National Survey of Healthcare Organizations and Systems34 and as a key input to 
building the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Compendium of Health Systems35,36. 
Importantly, the OneKey files link providers to their practice sites, and contain information on whether 
those sites are owned by another entity (along with unique identifiers for those owning entities). The 
OneKey files link providers, based on NPI, to their practice site in each calendar year. The data contain 
variables to distinguish between types of practice sites (e.g., physician practice, hospital, ambulatory 
surgical center). The data also contain unique identifiers for practice sites, and any entities that own the 
practice.  
Finally, I also used the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) provider files. These files 
from CMS contain the NPI of each MSSP-participating provider in each calendar year, as well as 
identifiers for their associated accountable care organization (ACO). The MSSP provider files were used 
to account for differences in the incentives faced by those practices participating in an ACO. 
These files were joined together by attributing beneficiaries to their primary care practice and by 
linking MSSP participating providers to their practices. Medicare beneficiaries were first attributed to the 
primary care clinician (based on NPI) providing the plurality of primary care services in a given calendar 
year following the MSSP attribution method (see Appendix A for list of procedure codes used). Any 
clinician who billed for any of the qualifying primary care services was eligible (i.e., including nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants). The entire OneKey provider roster was merged with the MSSP 
provider roster in each year to identify which NPIs participated in the MSSP. NPIs and beneficiaries were 
then associated with a practice using the OneKey provider-practice roster. In the event that a given 




2.3.2 Study population 
 I included Medicare beneficiaries in each calendar year if they: (a) were at least 65 years old, (b) 
had full 12 months of Parts A and B coverage, and (c) were attributed to a OneKey practice. I included 
practices if they (a) had any of the following IQVIA-generated specialties: family practice, general 
practice, internal medicine, multispecialty practices, pediatrics, primary care, (b) were in the data across 
the study period, and (c) were not vertically integrated in 2012. Since I do not require that beneficiaries be 
in the data for more than one calendar year, the study uses repeated cross-sections of beneficiaries. 
2.3.3 Study variables 
 Vertical integration was captured using the ownership information in the OneKey database. That 
is, practices were considered vertically integrated in each year if they had an owning entity, and that 
owning entity also owned at least 1 hospital. Hospitals and practice sites were distinguished using the 
OneKey class of trade identifiers. 
 I assessed the effect of VI on spending and utilization outcomes. Spending outcomes included 
total Medicare spending, as well as the following subcomponents of spending: acute care hospital, skilled 
nursing facility (SNF) and inpatient rehabilitation, outpatient emergency department (ED), facility 
outpatient, evaluation and management (E&M) services, procedures, imaging, and tests. I analyzed these 
subcomponents to assess which types of services may be driving differences in total spending, as well as 
to separately analyze changes in hospital- versus professional spending. Each of the spending 
subcomponents are mutually exclusive. Utilization outcomes included hospital admissions, outpatient ED 
visits, total E&M visits, E&M visits from the outpatient file only, and SNF admissions. I separately 
analyzed all E&M visits and those E&M visits captured in the outpatient file since vertically integrated 
practices can bill for an additional facility fee for these services. See Appendix A for outcome variable 
specifications. 
2.3.4 Empirical strategy 
 To assess the effect of VI on Medicare beneficiary outcomes, I used a difference-in-differences 
design to exploit the staggered timing of practice changes in ownership. Since there are many treatment 
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groups (i.e., practices that experience VI) and many time periods, I used an event study specification 
which generalizes a two-period, two-group difference-in-differences and accounts for treatment effect 
dynamics. The effects are identified based on within-practice changes in ownership over the study period 
relative to practices that do not VI. Specifically, I estimated the following event study regression model 
for beneficiary i in practice j and year t: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
−2
𝑘=−5





∗ 1(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑘)
 
+ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑷𝒋𝒕𝜷 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡   
 
where Y represents the spending and utilization outcomes, 𝛿𝑡 represents hospital referral region (HRR)-
by-year fixed effects, 𝛾𝑗 represents practice fixed effects, X represents a vector of patient characteristics, 
and P represents a vector of time-varying practice characteristics. The coefficients 𝛽𝑘 and 𝜏𝑘 represent the 
event study indicators which are number of years relative to the calendar year in which a practice 
vertically integrates (denoted 𝑇𝑗). That is, 𝛽𝑘 represent the pre-VI effects (e.g., 2 years before VI) and 𝜏𝑘 
represent the post-VI effects (e.g., 2 years after VI) for practices that vertically integrate relative to 
practices that never vertically integrate over the study period. The regression is fully saturated in relative 
time to capture the full path of treatment effect dynamics with the exception of the omitted relative time 
period -1 (i.e., the effects are estimated relative to the year before VI). I controlled for the following 
beneficiary characteristics: age, gender, dual eligibility, disability status as the original reason for 
Medicare eligibility, Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) score, race/ethnicity, an indicator for 
whether the beneficiary lives in a high poverty census tract, and indicators for several conditions (acute 
myocardial infarction [AMI], stroke, hip fracture/dislocation, unstable angina, chronic heart failure 
[CHF], chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder [COPD], diabetes, renal disease, and cancer). In addition, 
I also controlled for the following time-varying practice characteristics: number of physicians, number of 
nurse practitioners, number of physician assistants, and percent of clinicians participating in the MSSP. 
The regressions were estimated using ordinary least squares, and standard errors were clustered by 
practice. In addition, because I tested many hypotheses (i.e., many event study indicators for each of 14 
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outcomes), I adjusted the event-study p-values using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to control the 
false discovery rate at 5%.37 
 The difference-in-differences design requires two key identification assumptions. First, the design 
requires parallel trends in potential outcomes for the treated and control units. That is, untreated units 
provide a valid counterfactual for treated units. In this study, this would require that in the absence of VI, 
beneficiaries of practices that experience VI would have had a similar outcome trend to beneficiaries who 
did not experience VI. Second, treated units cannot anticipate treatment and change their behavior before 
treatment occurs. In this study, this requires that practices experiencing VI do not begin treating patients 
differently before they integrate.  
I take several steps to address potential threats to identification. First, practices that VI may be 
different in some unobserved way that is correlated both with their decision to VI and with beneficiary 
outcomes. By adding practice fixed effects, the models account for all such unobserved time-invariant 
practice-level factors. Second, beneficiaries of VI practices may differ from those in non-VI practices. To 
examine these differences, I first assess differences in baseline (2012) covariates and outcomes of 
beneficiaries based on whether they were attributed to a practice that will eventually VI over the study 
period or a practice that does not VI (i.e., treated versus control). Second, I assess changes in beneficiary 
characteristics over time by re-estimating the event study regressions using each beneficiary covariate as 
the dependent variable. I also calculate standardized differences of each characteristic in relative time. 
That is, for each relative time period for practices experiencing VI, I calculate the standardized difference 
in the characteristics of beneficiaries served by those practices relative to all potential control 
beneficiaries (i.e., beneficiaries in the corresponding calendar years that do not experience VI). Together 
these analyses provide direct statistical tests of changes in beneficiary characteristics following VI as well 
as descriptive statistics on the magnitudes of any changes. Third, including HRR-by-year fixed effects 
controls for unobserved geographic factors (e.g., delivery and insurer market structure), as well as 
regional secular trends in outcomes. This restricts the comparisons of treated practices to untreated 
practices within the same HRR and accounts for the fact that they exist within the same healthcare market 
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structure. Together these steps increase the credibility that practices experiencing VI over the study period 
would have performed similarly to non-VI practices absent a change in ownership. Finally, the event 
study specification allows me to examine pre-VI differences in outcomes for treated and untreated 
beneficiaries. While not a direct test of the parallel trends assumption, a lack of any differences in the pre-
period could provide some reassurance of trends in potential outcomes. I assess the plausibility of the 
parallel trends assumption based on the practical significance of the pre-VI coefficients rather than relying 
on statistical significance per se. This assessment of the parallel trends assumption is increasingly 
recommended in the difference-in-differences literature.38,39 In addition, examining the pre-VI coefficients 
allows me to assess whether beneficiary outcomes began changing in the periods leading up to vertical 
integration as evidence of anticipation. 
 The literature on difference-in-differences with staggered treatment timing is rapidly evolving. 
There is growing consensus that studies using two-way fixed effects (i.e., unit and time fixed effects) and 
a single, absorbing indicator for treatment are problematic due to non-intuitive and non-convex weighting 
of the difference-in-differences estimate, especially when treatment effects change over time.40-42 In 
response to these issues, researchers recommend an event study specification since it overcomes some of 
the issues with a single difference-in-difference coefficient.41 Some issues may remain in the event study 
specification with two-way fixed effects, which again relate to non-convex and non-intuitive weighting 
issues resulting in bias and contamination across the event study coefficients. Several authors have 
proposed new estimators that correct these weighting issues, but these estimators either have not yet been 
proven to apply to repeated cross-sectional data and/or have not considered the role of covariates.43,44 
Since I have repeated cross-sectional data on beneficiaries and it is important to account for beneficiary 
risk factors when examining spending and utilization outcomes, I rely on the newly-emerging standard 
event study specification in this study. 
 I used Stata version 16.1MP for all data management and analysis. This study was approved by 




2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 The final analytic sample consisted of 53,055,180 beneficiary-year observations, or about 9 
million beneficiaries per year, and 24,101 primary care practices. Of these, 2,843 practices (12%) 
vertically integrated with a health system over the study period, corresponding to up to 19% of included 
Medicare beneficiaries in a given year. 
 Table 1 displays baseline (2012) characteristics of beneficiaries attributed to primary care 
practices that VI over the study period (i.e., the treatment group) compared to beneficiaries in unaffected 
practices (i.e., the control group). Rather than conduct statistical inference on the differences given the 
large sample size, I instead assessed standardized differences. At baseline, beneficiaries attributed to 
practices that eventually VI were quite similar to beneficiaries attributed to unaffected practices. Practices 
that eventually VI had slightly fewer dual-eligible beneficiaries (standardized difference = -0.119) and a 
different racial/ethnic beneficiary profile (e.g., more non-Hispanic White beneficiaries, standardized 
difference = 0.162). Similarly, Table 2 displays differences in baseline outcomes between the two groups. 
There were no sizable differences in any of the spending or utilization outcomes at baseline. Together, 
these descriptive analyses suggest that there were very few measurable differences in the characteristics 
of beneficiaries served by practices that eventually VI compared to those served by practices that do not 
VI.   
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n=7,518,744   
Characteristic Mean (SD) Standardized difference 
Age 75.320 (7.562) 75.278 (7.580) 0.005 
HCC score 0.937 (0.874) 0.963 (0.909) -0.030 
 N (%)  
Female 936863 (59.3) 4466133 (59.4) -0.002 
Any dual eligibility 164306 (10.4) 1075180 (14.3) -0.119 
Disabled 129549 (8.2) 676686 (9) -0.030 
AMI 17378 (1.1) 82706 (1.1) -0.002 
Stroke 34757 (2.2) 187968 (2.5) -0.014 
Hip fracture/dislocation 18958 (1.2) 90224 (1.2) -0.008 
Ischemic Heart Disease 14218 (0.9) 75187 (1) -0.010 
CHF 135868 (8.6) 684205 (9.1) -0.016 
COPD 150087 (9.5) 766911 (10.2) -0.022 
Diabetes 377589 (23.9) 1887204 (25.1) -0.027 
Chronic Kidney Disease 23698 (1.5) 120299 (1.6) -0.011 
Cancer 153247 (9.7) 699243 (9.3) 0.014 
Lives in high poverty census tract 252779 (16) 1451118 (19) -0.085 
Race/ethnicity  0.162 
     Non-Hispanic White 1421244 (89.9) 6396190 (85.1)  
     Black 90099 (5.7) 536340 (7.1)  
     Hispanic 39855 (2.5) 365233 (4.8)  



















practices that never 
vertically integrate 
n=7,518,744   
Characteristic Mean (SD) Standardized difference 
Total spending 8425.013 (17200.449) 8951.063 (19272.576) -0.029 
Hospital spending 2514.053 (8899.382) 2638.942 (9272.188) -0.014 
OP ED spending 74.558 (208.270) 74.744 (212.548) -0.001 
Facility spending 16.264 (47.427) 14.004 (44.608) 0.049 
E&M spending 1037.874 (1663.750) 1093.502 (1745.861) -0.033 
Procedure spending 1348.869 (2940.588) 1352.008 (3029.407) -0.001 
Imaging spending 521.500 (798.732) 527.783 (815.335) -0.008 
Test spending 418.904 (607.524) 449.903 (640.606) -0.050 
SNF rehab spending 627.491 (3779.003) 716.060 (4141.888) -0.022 
Hospital admissions 0.274 (0.725) 0.287 (0.754) -0.017 
OP ED visits 0.357 (0.890) 0.360 (0.924) -0.004 
Ambulatory E&M visits 10.316 (8.599) 10.464 (8.858) -0.017 
OP E&M visits 1.140 (2.952) 0.922 (2.721) 0.077 
SNF rehab admissions 0.057 (0.308) 0.063 (0.329) -0.019 
 
In addition, neither the beneficiary characteristics regressions or the standardized differences 
plots reveal changes in characteristics of beneficiaries treated at VI practices relative to those treated at 
non-VI practices over time (results not shown; see Appendix A). This indicates that practices did not 
differentially select their Medicare patients as a result of vertical integration. 
2.4.2 Spending results 
Table 3 displays the results of the spending regressions. The coefficients represent the effect of 
VI on beneficiary-level outcomes relative to the counterfactual of not experiencing a change in practice 
ownership in each year relative to the year before VI for acquired practices. The pre-VI coefficients are 
mostly statistically indistinguishable from zero, indicating similar pre-period trends in outcomes. 
However, there were some differences four years prior to VI in total spending, acute care hospital 
spending, and E&M services which suggest there was lower spending among beneficiaries attributed to 
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VI practices well before VI occurred. Following VI, there was a significant increase in average spending 
across nearly all measures in each time period, relative to practices in the same HRR that did not 
experience VI. Each measure generally responded VI by year 2 or 3 following VI, with the effect 
estimates culminating by year 4. Total spending increased following VI, culminating in an increase by 
$182 (95% CI: 95, 268) and $238 (95% CI: 108, 368) annually per beneficiary on average three and four 
years after VI, respectively. Acute care hospital spending represented the largest subcomponent increase, 
increasing by $82 (95% CI: 42, 121) and $91 per beneficiary on average (95% CI: 32, 151) three and four 
years after VI, respectively. Outpatient ED spending increased in each year following VI by between $2 
and $4.59 per beneficiary on average depending on the amount of time following VI. Facility outpatient 
spending (not including E&M facility fees) increased by less than $1 per beneficiary in each year 
following VI. Spending on E&M services increased by $34 (95% CI: 17, 51) and $35 (95% CI: 15, 55) 
annually per beneficiary three and four years after VI. Imaging spending increased in each year following 
VI, culminating in an increase of $18 (95% CI: 10, 26) per beneficiary two years after VI. Spending for 
procedures and SNF services did not respond to VI.  
These spending results were robust to adjusting the measures to account for geographic 
standardization (Appendix A).45 That is, to account for geographic differences in Medicare prices, I 
multiplied each spending measure by the ratio of total standardized Medicare spending to actual spending 






Table 2.3. Regression results for spending outcomes 
 Total spending Acute care hospital 
spending 
Outpatient ED Facility 
outpatient 
E&M services Procedures Imaging Tests SNF 
5 years before 
VI 
-7.906 -9.607 -1.975 -0.663 -1.151 1.496 -10.23 5.923 28.684 
 [-102.300,-86.480] [-54.848,35.613] [-4.824,0.827] [-1.203,-0.123] [-11.93,9.629] [-14.662,17.654] [-18.784,-1.675] [-0.53,12.736] [-102.3,86.48] 
          
4 years before 
VI 
-105.032** -52.267** -0.701 -0.380 -9.471* -7.728 -2.003 3.971 7.274 
 [-179.110,-30.954] [-85.418,-19.115] [-2.869,1.467] [-0.782,0.022] [-17.776,-1.167] [-18.947,3.491] [-8.241,4.234] [-0.515,8.457] [-22.692,37.240] 
          
3 years before 
VI 
-57.528 -33.222* 0.179 -0.267 -6.839 -8.909 -2.494 -0.666 11.333 
 [-120.425,5.369] [-64.071,-2.374] [-1.388,1.746] [-0.626,0.092] [-13.834,0.155] [-18.436,0.618] [-7.972,2.984] [-4.513,3.181] [-13.458,36.123] 
          
2 years before 
VI 
-12.588 -7.866 -0.263 -0.028 -5.856 -2.036 0.379 0.232 -2.244 
 [-61.745,36.569] [-31.476,15.744] [-1.430,0.904] [-0.293,0.237] [-11.643,-0.069] [-10.068,5.995] [-3.640,4.399] [-2.694,3.157] [-22.735,18.248] 
          
Year of VI -13.404 0.249 1.659** 0.466** -1.595 -0.928 6.108** -3.455** -17.764 
 [-56.453,29.646] [-21.398,21.895] [0.525,2.793] [0.180,0.752] [-7.293,4.102] [-8.276,6.420] [1.753,10.463] [-6.080,-0.829] [-33.414,-2.114] 
          
1 year   after 
VI 
28.181 18.668 2.120** 0.844*** 5.403 3.129 10.308*** -3.868* -12.102 
 [-23.948,80.310] [-6.630,43.965] [0.570,3.671] [0.451,1.236] [-1.770,12.576] [-6.409,12.666] [4.402,16.215] [-7.096,-0.640] [-32.974,8.769] 
          
2 years after 
VI 
153.761 88.658 2.190 0.761** 9.347 -0.103 18.426*** -2.532 29.014 
 [-12.271,319.793] [1.956,175.359] [0.284,4.096] [0.299,1.223] [-0.412,19.106] [-11.466,11.261] [10.633,26.218] [-7.855,2.791] [-54.895,112.923] 
          
3 years after 
VI 






 [95.738,268.680] [42.827,121.911] [2.133,7.051] [-0.155,1.094] [17.344,51.501] [-9.599,19.705] [7.995,25.207] [-0.484,8.621] [-23.696,33.840] 
          
4 years after 
VI 
238.526*** 91.788** 3.998* 0.979* 35.548*** 2.266 7.347 -1.794 18.068 
 [108.462,368.590] [32.240,151.337] [0.699,7.297] [0.217,1.742] [15.953,55.143] [-15.824,20.356] [-3.311,18.005] [-7.543,3.954] [-26.364,62.501] 
Observations 53055180 53055180 53055180 53055180 53055180 53055180 53055180 53055180 53055180 
Numbers represent regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Standard errors clustered by practice. Significance levels corrected for multiple hypothesis testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure. 




2.4.3 Utilization results 
Table 4 displays the results of the utilization regressions. As with the spending regressions, there 
were some differences in utilization years before VI. There were persistent differences in pre-VI 
utilization of total E&M services and E&M services in outpatient facilities in particular such that 
beneficiaries of practices that eventually VI had higher E&M utilization than those in practices that did 
not experience VI over the study period. Following VI, hospital admissions increased in each year, 
culminating in an increase of 0.007 (95% CI: 0.002, 0.012) admissions four years after VI, or by about 7 
admissions per 1,000 beneficiaries. Outpatient ED visits also increased every year following VI, 
culminating in an increase of 0.011 (95% CI: 0.005, 0.018) visits on average four years after VI, or by 
about 11 per 1,000 beneficiaries. Total E&M visits and E&M visits in outpatient facilities declined each 
year after VI by as much as -0.198 (95% CI: -0.335, -0.062) and -0.153 (95% CI: -.264, -0.041) four years 








Table 2.4. Regression results for utilization outcomes 
 Hospital admissions Outpatient ED visits Total E&M visits E&M visits from OP SNF admissions 
5 years before VI -0.001 -0.002 0.165*** 0.101** 0.001 
 [-0.005,0.002] [-0.009,0.004] [0.059,0.272] [0.003,0.199] [-0.002,0.005] 
      
4 years before VI -0.003* -0.003 0.154*** 0.104** 0.000 
 [-0.006,-0.001] [-0.008,0.001] [0.070,0.238] [0.032,0.177] [-0.002,0.003] 
      
3 years before VI -0.002 -0.001 0.101** 0.099** 0.000 
 [-0.005,-0.000] [-0.005,0.002] [0.028,0.174] [0.040,0.158] [-0.002,0.002] 
      
2 years before VI -0.000 -0.001 0.044 0.074*** 0.000 
 [-0.002,0.001] [-0.004,0.002] [-0.009,0.098] [0.034,0.114] [-0.002,0.002] 
      
Year of VI 0.001 0.004** -0.020 0.045 -0.001 
 [-0.000,0.003] [0.001,0.007] [-0.076,0.037] [-0.005,0.095] [-0.003,0.000] 
      
1 year after VI 0.003** 0.006*** -0.039 0.043 -0.001 
 [0.001,0.005] [0.003,0.009] [-0.118,0.040] [-0.025,0.111] [-0.003,0.001] 
      
2 years after VI 0.006** 0.006* -0.076 -0.015 0.002 
 [0.002,0.010] [0.001,0.010] [-0.197,0.044] [-0.100,0.071] [-0.004,0.009] 
      
3 years after VI 0.006*** 0.008*** -0.152* -0.085 -0.000 
 [0.003,0.009] [0.004,0.013] [-0.267,-0.036] [-0.185,0.015] [-0.002,0.002] 
      
4 years after VI 0.007** 0.011*** -0.198** -0.153** 0.002 
 [0.002,0.012] [0.005,0.018] [-0.335,-0.062] [-0.264,-0.041] [-0.001,0.005] 
Observations 53055180 53055180 53055180 53055180 53055180 
Numbers represent regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Standard errors clustered by practice. Significance levels corrected for multiple hypothesis testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure. 




2.5.1 Synthesizing and contextualizing results 
 Using longitudinal data on over 24,000 primary care practices linked to their Medicare fee-for-
service patients over the period 2012-2017, I find that vertical integration of primary care practices with 
hospitals affects spending and utilization outcomes. My results show that VI leads to increased total 
spending per beneficiary by up to $238, most of which was due to increased spending for acute care 
hospital spending and E&M services. In addition, hospital-based utilization increased while E&M visits 
decreased.  
 The estimated increase in E&M spending and simultaneous decrease in E&M utilization 
illustrates a change in unit prices paid by Medicare as a result of VI. That is, practices’ ability to bill for 
an additional facility fee makes primary care E&M visits more expensive. The higher prices per visit 
result in increased spending, despite lower volume of E&M services.  
That E&M utilization was higher for VI practices before they integrated raises a number of 
important questions. First, the pre-VI differences may speak to the types of practices that pursue VI. That 
is, these may be over-worked practices that wish to reduce their workload without necessarily seeing a 
reduction in their revenues, so they pursue VI as a way to reduce business risk. In this case, the downward 
trend before VI represents workload reductions. Second, practices may intentionally reduce their 
Medicare volume while increasing volume for privately-insured patients before seeking acquisition to 
seem more financially attractive to potential buyers. So, the pre-VI differences may represent the strategic 
choice to reduce Medicare volumes leading into VI while those practices remaining independent may not 
change their service volume by payer. 
Moreover, that the volume of E&M services continued to decrease each period following VI  to 
some extent runs counter to one proposed mechanism of VI – that it will reduce administrative burdens of 
physicians and allow them to spend more time seeing patients. The reduction in E&M volume following 
VI could be due to several factors. First, practices often transition to a new EHR system once they join a 
health system.47,48 This transition may impact clinical workflows and reduce provider productivity, 
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resulting in seeing fewer patients per day.48 Second, acquired physicians often move to a salaried 
compensation plan following acquisition by a health system.47,48 This change in payment may reduce the 
volume incentive physicians had when owning an independent practice and result in reduced productivity 
either by spending more time with patients per visit and/or by seeing fewer patients in a day. Third, 
vertically integrated systems are able to negotiate higher payment rates with private payers. As this 
occurs, seeing an additional Medicare patient may be less financially attractive to the practice and their 
owning system relative to higher-reimbursed privately-insured patients. So, practices may shift their 
volume of services toward privately-insured patients and away from Medicare patients. Better 
understanding the selection of practices before acquisition and the effect on productivity and practice 
operations following VI merits future research.  
 Many of the changes in outcomes measured do not occur until 2-3 years following VI. Even once 
a practice is purchased by a health care system, it may take time to operationally integrate.2 This includes 
time required to finalize contracts, update financial and accounting processes, and reconfigure workflow 
and human resources needs. A previous study based on interviews with recently-acquired practices found 
it typically took 2-3 years to transition physicians to the new compensation and performance plan of the 
owning health system, and could take anywhere from 6 months to 5 years to fully integrate all clinical and 
operational functions.47 My findings are in line with this description of the integration process, suggesting 
that it may take time to significantly change provider behavior following a change in ownership.  
 The findings related to shifting care from outpatient to inpatient and hospital-based care do not 
appear consistent with an efficiency-enhancing motivator for VI. Instead, these findings are more aligned 
with a profit-maximizing vertically integrated firm seeking the use of higher-reimbursed services. This 
shift is similar to the one identified by Koch and colleagues, though the magnitudes are different owing to 
the different levels of measurement (i.e., they measured at the physician- and group-levels whereas I 
measured at the individual beneficiary-level) and differences in the sample of physician practices (i.e., 
they included specialty groups).17 For example, they found an 18% increase in spending following VI 
while I find up to a 2.7% average increase in total spending per beneficiary four years after VI. Baker and 
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colleagues do not find a statistically significant relationship between changes in ownership and spending, 
but this could be due to the fact that they only had two time periods and their sample may consist of 
relatively more recent acquisitions without sufficient time to operationally integrate.  
 This study adds to the evidence that VI does not appear to live up to the promise of reduced 
spending and increased efficiency. The shift away from outpatient and office-based care towards hospital-
based (hospital admissions, ED) care is particularly concerning as it runs counter to nearly all payment 
and delivery reforms spear-headed by Medicare. Moreover, I find that VI leads to increased Medicare 
spending per beneficiary. Coupled with the overwhelming evidence that VI leads to increased commercial 
prices9, trends in VI exert pressure on Medicare to increase their payment rates. This would occur as a 
result of an increasing differential between what commercial insurers will pay for a given service relative 
to what Medicare pays.6 These payment differentials pose a risk for Medicare beneficiary access to care 
absent either a reduction in the growth rate of commercial prices or increases in Medicare payments. 
Increased prices in addition to increased spending without countervailing increases in quality of care 
increase the costs imposed on tax-payers without added benefit. 
2.5.2 Policy options 
 There are several policy options for addressing vertical integration. First, Medicare and other 
payers could make payments site-neutral (i.e., pay the same amount regardless of whether a practice is 
independent or hospital-owned). This could somewhat insulate payers from the increases in spending 
resulting simply from a change in ownership, as well as potentially disincentivize some practices from 
pursuing VI.  
Other policy solutions could make vertical integration relatively less attractive and help to 
support the independence of primary care practices. For example, the burden and complexity of 
performance reporting associated with new payment models incentivizes independent practices to pursue 
VI for the administrative support required to comply with these requirements.2,47,49 Primary care 
physicians spend hundreds of hours per year responding to quality measurement programs.50 The 
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), bipartisan legislation passed in 2015 to 
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reform physician reimbursement, created the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) which is a 
pay-for-performance system that requires substantial reporting effort from providers. Providers and other 
stakeholders have recommended repealing MIPS and replacing it with a simpler set of population-based 
quality measures derived from administrative data.49,51 Such a change would provide relief to primary 
care practices and may prevent future consolidation.51 Second, the volume and site-of-service incentives 
accompanying VI could be blunted with more wide-spread use of population-based payment 
arrangements with performance incentives. These payment models could provide independent primary 
care practices with the necessary revenue stability and flexibility in treating patients, as well as an 
incentive to focus on outcomes, that together could support the delivery of comprehensive primary care 
and reduce the relative attractiveness of joining a large health system. Third, additional opportunities for 
financial and technical support for practice transformation efforts could reduce the appeal of VI. For 
example, the Comprehensive Primary Care Plus (CPC+) initiative from CMS offers care management 
fees in addition to partially-capitated payments, as well as a learning network for practices and payers to 
disseminate best practices. Further spread of this program and others from multiple payers could provide 
important resources to support practice transformation while maintaining independence.52 Finally, 
antitrust enforcement could deter future acquisitions. While the Federal Trade Commission has 
historically limited challenges to horizontal consolidation in health care, federal and state antitrust 
authorities could create health care market-specific guidelines to investigate whether vertical mergers are 
helping or harming patients.29,53 
2.5.3 Limitations 
 The findings from this study should be considered in light of several limitations. First, OneKey 
may capture practice ownership with error. This may include misclassifying practices as owned when 
they are not or vice versa, or not accurately recording the timing of ownership changes. In either case, 
such measurement error would bias the regression results towards zero, so the estimated effects would be 
understated. Second, integration can be considered a continuum rather than a binary classification. While 
there are several important components of integration (e.g., structural, functional, normative, 
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interpersonal, and process54) and variation in the extent of these components, I am unable to measure 
integration beyond a binary ownership indicator. However, the ownership of primary care practices is a 
policy-relevant feature as consolidation directly affects costs and delivery of care. Third, this study only 
considers outcomes for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries and does not represent the full effects of VI 
on all patients. Medicare is the largest single payer of primary care services and drives payment and 
delivery innovation. In addition, Medicare rates are not negotiable like those of private insurers, so the 
spending increases found in this study may represent a lower bound on the effects for spending on the 
privately-insured. So, understanding the effects of VI in the Medicare program is important for 
policymakers and providers. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 In this study, I provide evidence that primary care practice vertical integration leads to increased 
spending per Medicare beneficiary and a shift in utilization patterns away from office- towards hospital-
based care. This pattern of results aligns with the incentives health systems face in a fee-for-service 
payment system but run counter to most payment and delivery innovations that prioritize shifting care 
away from inpatient and towards ambulatory care settings. Future studies should examine the effect of 
primary care practice VI on quality of care, in addition to patient and provider satisfaction. It is possible 
that the increases in spending and utilization are met with contemporaneous improvements in quality, 
though the literature to date does not support this claim.5,9 
 The results from this study have important implications for bending the cost curve and for a 
potential future wave of integration among health care providers. The COVID-19 pandemic has placed an 
incredible amount of stress on primary care practices. With increasing rates of burnout, independent 
practices may soon look to VI with health systems for much needed financial and administrative support. 
Absent any policy intervention to support independent practices, the looming consolidation wave may 
spell the end of the independent practice and may further exacerbate an ever-worsening trend in health 
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CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF PRIMARY CARE PRACTICE VERTICAL INTEGRATION ON 
QUALITY OF CARE FOR MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE BENEFICIARIES 
3.1 Introduction 
 In order to address concerns over low and uneven quality and rising costs of care, reform sparked 
by the Affordable Care Act promoted the transformation of the US healthcare system.1 Transformation 
has occurred through a combination of payment and organizational innovation.2 Payment innovation has 
focused on changing from a largely fee-for-service based system to alternative models that instead include 
accountability for the cost and/or quality of care for individuals and populations. Such payment models 
include accountable care organizations, bundled payments, and pay-for-performance initiatives. At the 
same time, and perhaps in response to changes in payment systems, providers have joined together to 
form new integrated systems. This includes both horizontal integration (e.g., hospital mergers) as well as 
vertical integration (e.g., the formation of health systems that own both hospitals and physician practices). 
Rates of vertical integration (VI) have increased recently, particularly among primary care physicians. For 
example, there was a 57% increase in the proportion of primary care physicians working in VI systems 
over the period 2010-20163, and a 32% increase over the period 2016-20184. 
 There are several motivating reasons for pursuing vertical integration among hospitals and 
primary care practices. Primary care practices may pursue VI for access to capital and infrastructure of a 
large system and to reduce administrative burdens, both of which could aid practices to adopt costly 
advanced capabilities to improve care.5,6 Hospitals may aim to increase referral rates and leverage with 
insurers.7 Many stakeholders believe these integrated systems will lead to improved quality of care 
through improved care coordination across the continuum, enhanced use of electronic health records and 
data analytics, and standardization of best practices across sites.8,9  
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 Despite the promise of VI improving quality of care, the evidence to date is mixed. Several 
systematic reviews have noted inconsistent evidence due mostly to a wide variety of quality measures 
analyzed and research designs.8,10,11 Of the 10 studies examining the relationship between VI and quality 
included in the most recent systematic review, 9 were judged by the authors to be of very low or low 
quality and only 1 was of moderate quality.11 Two more recent studies not included in any of the 
systematic reviews found either no or a small relationship between VI and quality of care.12,13 Notably, 
most studies on VI and quality of care used cross-sectional research designs which only allow for 
associations and do not account for changes in ownership. Two studies using longitudinal research 
designs either were limited to one particular geographic market14 or considered quality outcomes through 
2012 which predates many of the major recent health reform efforts.12 So, whether VI leads to changes in 
quality of care outcomes in the post-ACA era remains an open empirical question. 
 In this study, I directly address the gaps in the literature by analyzing how within-practice 
changes in ownership of primary care practices affects quality of care for Medicare fee-for-service 
beneficiaries.  
3.2 Methods 
 I used longitudinal data on Medicare beneficiaries and their primary care practices over the period 
2012-2017. These data were derived from the Dartmouth Comparative Health System Performance 
Initiative Center of Excellence, funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.15 
 The data and methods used in this chapter resemble those from Aim 1 as they relate to a similar 
conceptual model. Briefly, the vertical integration of hospitals and physician practices results in a joint 
utility function such that the organizations now consider resource use and outcomes across settings. Some 
of these resources may lead to improvements in quality of care, including: use of a unified electronic 
health record (EHR) system, shared communication systems, advanced data and analytic capabilities, 
administrative support, and support for best practices in care delivery. These capabilities, which can be 
costly and unavailable to independent primary care practices, have the potential to affect care 
coordination and primary care quality. Use of a unified EHR and shared communication, for example, 
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may allow health systems to monitor care needed when a patient is discharged from the hospital. Ensuring 
patients receive needed care during this vulnerable period may serve to reduce hospital readmissions. 
Other capabilities may improve the quality of care delivered in the primary care practice. For example, 
administrative support, such as through handling negotiations with payers or responding to performance 
data requirements of payment initiatives, may result in more time spent by primary care clinicians 
delivering care to patients which in turn results in patients receiving more comprehensive primary care. 
Support for best practices in care delivery, such as using patient registries for care management activities 
or use of quality improvement initiatives, may increase primary care clinicians’ ability to ensure their 
patients receive necessary preventive and screening measures. On the other hand, there are several 
mechanisms that may have a negative effect on quality of care following VI: loss of physician autonomy 
as a result of the top-down management of clinical care, complex organizational and bureaucratic 
structures making it harder to communicate and coordinate care, and pursuing VI for the purpose of 
increasing market power and leverage with insurers without changing care delivery. Taken together, 
while vertical integration has the potential to improve care coordination and primary care quality, whether 
and to what extent it does is an open empirical question. 
3.2.1 Data sources 
 Beneficiary characteristics and quality measures were derived from the Master Beneficiary 
Summary File and 100% claims files in each calendar year, respectively. Claims were aggregated to the 
beneficiary-level to create beneficiary-year files. Each annual file contained demographic characteristics, 
chronic conditions, and quality of care measures for each beneficiary. 
 Provider and practice characteristics were derived from the IQVIA OneKey database. This 
commercial database contains information on nearly the universe of providers and health care 
organizations in the US. The database represents a combination of legacy datasets from SK&A and IMS, 
which were used in previous studies on practice integration.16-19 The OneKey files link individual 
providers to their practice sites and have data on whether a particular site is owned by another entity (and 
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if so, which one). Individual providers, sites, and owners each have unique identifiers which are used to 
link practices to systems over time. 
 Beneficiaries were attributed to their primary care clinician through a claims-based attribution 
method, and clinicians were linked to their practice sites based on a cross-walk of individual providers 
and practices. Specifically, Medicare beneficiaries were attributed to the primary care clinician providing 
the plurality of primary care services in a given calendar year following the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program (MSSP) attribution method. Any clinician who billed for any of the quality primary care services 
was eligible. The resulting files represented longitudinal data on practices and their beneficiaries. 
Medicare beneficiaries were included in the study in each calendar year if they (a) were at least 
65 years old, (b) had 12 full months of Parts A and B coverage, and (c) were attributed to a OneKey 
practice that (i) had any of the following IQVIA-generated specialties: family practice, general practice, 
internal medicine, multispecialty practice, pediatrics, or primary care, (ii) was in the data across the study 
period, and (iii) was not vertically integrated in 2012. 
3.2.2 Measures 
 Practice ownership was derived from the OneKey database. Practices were considered vertically 
integrated in each year if they had an owning entity, and that owning entity also owned at least 1 hospital 
(as identified using the organization type variable in the files). 
 I analyzed the effect of VI on Medicare beneficiary quality of care outcomes. The quality 
outcomes were related to two domains: (i) coordinating care between physicians and hospitals, and (ii) 
primary care quality. Measures related to coordination included: 1) 30-day hospital readmissions, 2) 
receipt of a follow-up ambulatory visit within 14-days of hospital discharge with any provider (i.e., any 
specialty, and including NPs and PAs), and 3) receipt of a follow-up ambulatory visit within 14 days of 
hospital discharge with a primary care physician. Each of these measures may respond to VI through 
efforts made to improve care coordination. For example, a unified EHR system and other means of 
communication may result in sharing important patient information following discharge with their PCP. 
This may result in a necessary follow-up visit or other services which may prevent a hospital readmission. 
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All three measures related to care coordination were binary, indicating whether a given beneficiary 
experienced any of these services within a given calendar year. Measures related to primary care quality 
included: 1) ambulatory care sensitive (ACS) admissions, 2) comprehensive diabetes care (receipt of 
HbA1c test, eye exam, blood lipids test), and 3) receipt of mammogram for eligible beneficiaries. ACS 
admissions were defined using the AHRQ Prevention Quality Indicator composite measure for 
admissions for adults with chronic conditions, and represent admissions that may have been prevented 
had beneficiaries received adequate primary care for their conditions. Following VI, primary care 
practices may have the ability to provide better, more comprehensive care for their patients as the health 
system handles administrative functions formerly handled by the practices. The diabetes and 
mammogram measures were derived using HEDIS specifications. Increased use of health information 
technology and care-improving processes (e.g., using patient registry data for panel management) as a 
result of VI may result in improved rates of beneficiaries receiving recommended screening and testing 
services. See Appendix B for details on measure specifications. 
3.2.3 Statistical analysis 
 I used a difference-in-differences design to exploit the staggered timing of practice changes in 
ownership over the study period. That is, I analyzed how within-practice changes in ownership affected 
changes in beneficiary quality of care outcomes, relative to beneficiaries attributed to practices that did 
not join a health system. For each beneficiary-level outcome, the regression models included indicators 
for the number of years before and after practices changed ownership, practice fixed effects, hospital 
referral region (HRR)-by-year fixed effects, beneficiary characteristics, and time-varying practice 
characteristics. Beneficiary characteristics included age, gender, dual eligibility, disability status as the 
original reason for Medicare eligibility, Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) score, race/ethnicity, an 
indicator for whether the beneficiary lives in a high-poverty census tract, and indicators for the following 
conditions: acute myocardial infarction, stroke, hip fracture/dislocation, unstable angina, chronic heart 
failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, diabetes, renal disease, and cancer. Time-varying practice 
characteristics included the number of physicians, number of nurse practitioners, number of physician 
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assistants, and percent of clinicians participating in the MSSP. Percent of clinicians (i.e., physicians, 
nurse practitioners, physician assistants) participating in MSSP was derived from the annual MSSP 
provider files. These files contain the NPI of each MSSP provider for each calendar year and were linked 
to the OneKey provider roster based on NPI. Practice fixed effects accounted for all time-invariant, 
unobserved practice-level characteristics, while the HRR-by-year fixed effects account for unobserved 
geographic factors and regional secular trends in outcomes. Including indicators for each year before and 
after VI allows me to analyze the dynamics of changes in outcomes as a result of VI. That is, quality of 
care outcomes may not respond immediately to changes in practice ownership, and my models allow me 
to estimate the relationship between VI and quality of care in each of the 4 years following VI. 
 All models were estimated with ordinary least squares regression, with standard errors clustered 
by practice. Since most outcome variables were binary, the regressions represent linear probability 
models and estimate changes in the percentage point probability of beneficiaries receiving a given 
service. The exception is ACS admissions, which was measured as a count. P-values on the regression 
coefficients were adjusted using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate at 
5%.20  
I used Stata version 16.1MP for all data management and analysis. This study was approved by 
the Dartmouth College Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. 
3.3 Results 
 The final analytic files consisted of 53,055,180 beneficiary-year observations, or about 9 million 
beneficiaries per year, and 24,101 primary care practices. Of these, 2,842 practices (12%) vertically 
integrated with a health system over the study period, corresponding to up to 19% of included Medicare 
beneficiaries in a given year. 
 Table 1 shows baseline (2012) characteristics of beneficiaries attributed to primary care practices 
that VI over the study period compared to beneficiaries in unaffected practices. Because the sample sizes 
are large, I assess differences using standardized differences rather than rely on statistical inference. At 
baseline, beneficiaries attributed to practices that eventually vertically integrated were similar to 
 
42 
beneficiaries attributed to unaffected practices, based on the calculated standardized differences. There 
were, however, small differences in whether beneficiaries were dually-eligible for Medicaid and the racial 
profile of beneficiaries, such that beneficiaries of practices that eventually VI during the study period 
were less likely to be dual-eligible and more likely to be White. 














n=7,518,744   
Characteristic Mean (SD) Standardized difference 
Age 75.320 (7.562) 75.278 (7.580) 0.005 
Female 0.593 (0.491) 0.594 (0.491) -0.002 
Any dual eligibility 0.104 (0.305) 0.143 (0.350) -0.119 
Disabled 0.082 (0.274) 0.090 (0.286) -0.030 
HCC score 0.937 (0.874) 0.963 (0.909) -0.030 
AMI 0.011 (0.103) 0.011 (0.104) -0.002 
Stroke 0.022 (0.148) 0.025 (0.155) -0.014 
Hip fracture/dislocation 0.012 (0.107) 0.012 (0.111) -0.008 
Ischemic Heart Disease 0.009 (0.096) 0.010 (0.101) -0.010 
CHF 0.086 (0.281) 0.091 (0.287) -0.016 
COPD 0.095 (0.293) 0.102 (0.302) -0.022 
Diabetes 0.239 (0.427) 0.251 (0.434) -0.027 
Chronic Kidney Disease 0.015 (0.121) 0.016 (0.127) -0.011 
Cancer 0.097 (0.296) 0.093 (0.290) 0.014 
Lives in high poverty census tract 0.160 (0.367) 0.193 (0.394) -0.085 
Race/ethnicity n (%) 0.162 
     Non-Hispanic White 1421244 (89.959) 6396190 (85.070)  
     Black 90099 (5.703) 536340 (7.133)  
     Hispanic 39855 (2.523) 365233 (4.858)  
     Other 28673 (1.815) 220981 (2.939)  
 
 
 Table 2 shows baseline (2012) summary statistics on quality outcomes beneficiaries attributed to 
practices that eventually VI and those attributed to unaffected practices. Based on the standardized 
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differences, there were no substantial (greater than .10) differences in quality outcomes at baseline among 
beneficiaries in each group. 















n=7,518,744   
Characteristic % receiving 
Standardized 
difference 
30-day readmissions following any 
discharge 0.108 (0.310) 0.111 (0.315) -0.010 
Any ambulatory 14-day follow-up visits 
after discharge 0.702 (0.457) 0.693 (0.461) 0.021 
14-day follow-up visits with PCP after 
discharge 0.540 (0.498) 0.526 (0.499) 0.027 
Diabetes HbA1c testing 0.871 (0.336) 0.860 (0.347) 0.032 
Diabetes eye exam 0.728 (0.445) 0.707 (0.455) 0.047 
Diabetes blood lipid screening 0.816 (0.388) 0.814 (0.389) 0.003 
Mammogram 0.715 (0.451) 0.689 (0.463) 0.058 
 Mean (SD)  
ACS admissions 0.028 (0.212) 0.030 (0.224) -0.010 
 
 Table 3 shows the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from the outcome regressions. 
Following VI, there was a slight reduction in the probability of having at least 1 hospital readmission in 
each year, through these differences were mostly not statistically significant. The exception was a 
reduction in the probability of being readmitted by about 0.4 percentage points (95% CI: -0.8, -0.000) 
four years following VI. There was a sharp and immediate decrease in the probability of having any 
ambulatory follow-up care within 14 days of hospital discharge following VI that persisted each year and 
culminated in a reduction of 4.6 percentage points (95% CI; -6.2, -3.0) four years after VI. When limited 
to follow-up visits specifically with PCPs, the pattern of results was the same, but culminated in a larger 







Table 3.3. Regression results 
  
Care coordination measures 
  
Primary care quality measures 












5 years before 
VI 
-0.0004 0.0104 -0.001  -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.00031 -0.0065 
 [-0.0038,0.003] [-0.0048,0.0257] [-0.013,0.010]  [-0.0017,0.00008] [-0.0057,0.0053] [-0.0056,0.0040] [-0.0069,0.0076] [-0.0119,0.0011] 
4 years before 
VI 
0.001 0.004 0.006  -0.001* -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 [-0.002,0.004] [-0.004,0.013] [-0.004,0.017]  [-0.002,-0.000] [-0.006,0.003] [-0.001,0.006] [-0.006,0.004] [-0.006,0.002] 
          
3 years before 
VI 
0.000 0.007 0.007  -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 
 [-0.002,0.003] [-0.000,0.014] [-0.002,0.016]  [-0.001,0.000] [-0.004,0.002] [-0.001,0.004] [-0.003,0.005] [-0.006,0.001] 
          
2 years before 
VI 
-0.000 0.004 0.005  -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.002 
 [-0.002,0.002] [-0.002,0.010] [-0.002,0.012]  [-0.001,0.000] [-0.005,0.003] [-0.002,0.003] [-0.000,0.007] [-0.004,0.001] 
          
Year of VI -0.001 -0.008** -0.007*  -0.000 -0.004** -0.001 -0.001 0.002* 
 [-0.003,0.001] [-0.013,-0.002] [-0.014,-0.001]  [-0.001,0.000] [-0.007,-0.001] [-0.003,0.001] [-0.004,0.002] [0.000,0.005] 
          
1 year after VI -0.002 -0.009* -0.012**  -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.003 
 [-0.004,0.000] [-0.016,-0.002] [-0.022,-0.003]  [-0.001,0.001] [-0.004,0.003] [-0.004,0.001] [-0.002,0.006] [-0.000,0.006] 
          
2 years after 
VI 
-0.002 -0.023*** -0.026***  0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.004 0.005* 
 [-0.005,0.001] [-0.032,-0.013] [-0.038,-0.015]  [-0.000,0.001] [-0.004,0.004] [-0.007,0.001] [-0.002,0.010] [0.001,0.010] 
          
3 years after 
VI 
-0.003 -0.038*** -0.048***  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 
 [-0.006,0.000] [-0.050,-0.025] [-0.063,-0.033]  [-0.001,0.001] [-0.005,0.004] [-0.005,0.005] [-0.007,0.005] [-0.002,0.009] 
          
4 years after 
VI 






 [-0.008,-0.000] [-0.062,-0.030] [-0.071,-0.033]  [-0.002,0.000] [-0.008,0.006] [-0.007,0.005] [-0.016,0.001] [0.001,0.015] 
Observations 8048987 3986852 3986852  53055180 14310607 14310607 14310607 13264032 
Numbers represent regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Standard errors clustered by practice. Significance levels corrected for multiple hypothesis testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The primary care quality measures largely did not change following VI. Specifically, there was 
no statistically significant effect on ACS admissions in any time period following VI. Similarly, there was 
no statistically significant effect on any diabetes-related measures, with the exception of a decrease in the 
probability of diabetic beneficiaries receiving an HbA1c test in the year following VI by 0.4 percentage 
points (95% CI: -0.7, -0.1). There were, however, small increases in the probability of receiving a 
mammogram among eligible women in each year following VI. There was a 0.2 percentage point increase 
the year of VI (95% CI: 0.0, 0.5), culminating in a 0.8 percentage point increase (95% CI: 0.1, 1.5) four 
years after VI. While statistically significant, the increases in mammography rates are not clinically 
significant. 
3.4 Discussion 
 Using longitudinal data on primary care practices linked to Medicare fee-for-service 
beneficiaries, I find little evidence that vertical integration of primary care practices with hospitals affects 
quality of care outcomes. Improved care coordination is one potential benefit of VI, yet the results of this 
study suggest that VI has little to no effect on 30-day readmissions and leads to decreased rates of follow-
up care following hospital discharge, both of which should be sensitive to care coordination efforts. 
Similarly, primary care quality did not change following VI: there was no effect on ACS admissions or 
most diabetes measures, other than a slight and temporary decrease in the probability of diabetic 
beneficiaries receiving an HbA1c test. There were, however, small increases in the probability of eligible 
Medicare beneficiaries receiving a mammogram. Together, these results suggest that VI does not live up 
to the promise of improved quality of care across most measures included in this study. 
 There are several potential explanations for why VI does not affect most quality of care outcomes 
considered in this study. First, changes in ownership may not substantially change care delivery for 
primary care practices. Previous studies have found that financial integration (i.e., ownership) is not 
associated with clinical integration21,22 or increased use of care delivery and quality-improvement related 
processes.12,19 So, following VI, providers may not appreciably change care delivery behavior or offer 
more advanced capabilities to help with improving quality of care. Instead, VI may serve primarily as a 
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way to increase referrals to system-owned hospitals and as a method for increasing leverage with private 
payers.5,6,23,24 Second, changes in care delivery and clinical integration may require more time than the 
period considered in this study. For example, one study found that it could take up to 5 years for a 
practice to be fully integrated in the acquiring health system.6 Future studies should consider a longer 
time-horizon following VI. Third, communication across site of care may be worse in a larger health 
system. While improved care coordination is one often-cited benefit of VI, I found that rates of follow-up 
care (which could be sensitive to communication) decreased following VI. Future research should 
examine how communication changes following VI, and the characteristics of health systems that help or 
hinder communication. 
 The magnitudes of the effects of VI on the quality measures analyzed in this study were small. 
However, the measures that did change might shed light on the underlying incentives faced by vertically 
integrated practices. Specifically, that mammograms and follow-up care respond to VI, while other 
quality measures do not, could be explained, at least in part, by the financial incentives facing health 
systems. Services are still reimbursed by Medicare on a fee-for-service basis when a practice joins a 
health system. Adding a primary care practice increases the opportunities for the owning health system to 
generate revenue by accounting for care delivered across owned settings (e.g., care delivered in owned 
practices and hospitals). From a financial perspective, quality measures can be conceptualized as those 
that are revenue-losing, revenue-neutral, or revenue-generating.25 In addition, some measure are 
commonly used for performance-reporting. For example, readmissions, ACS admissions, comprehensive 
diabetes care measures, and mammography rates are included in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment 
System (MIPS)26 and/or MSSP27 quality measure sets. Follow-up ambulatory visits, on the other hand, are 
not used for performance reporting in these programs. Taken together, quality measures for Medicare 
beneficiaries that (a) generate revenue for the owning health system directly from the services rendered 
and (b) could generate additional revenue through improved performance may respond most to VI. The 
diabetes-related measures may not be the highest margin services, but because of their inclusion in many 
performance-reporting initiatives, systems have an incentive to at least maintain their level of 
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performance. Readmissions and ACS admissions may represent an opportunity for revenue from the 
system’s perspective since they represent hospitalizations, but they also come at the risk of financial 
and/or reputational penalty. Mammograms, however, represent a service that generates additional revenue 
that accrues to the newly-owning health system through ordering imaging services and potential for 
specialist care25, and is commonly used for performance incentives. Ambulatory follow-up care, on the 
other hand, may represent a potential for revenue through the additional billable visit, but it is not 
commonly used for performance reporting. Moreover, a vertically integrated primary care practice may 
increase their volume of services for privately-insured patients due to the higher revenue potential, thus 
crowding out ambulatory visits for Medicare beneficiaries. Through this lens, increasing mammography 
rates and decreasing ambulatory follow-up visits after hospital discharge may be explained by the fee-for-
service payment incentives in the Medicare program and prevalence of use in performance reporting 
initiatives rather than vertical integration per se. 
 The findings from this study have important implications for the Medicare program. The results 
from previous studies suggest that Medicare spending increases following VI.16,28 The results from the 
current study suggest that the increased spending is not met with increases in quality of care for Medicare 
beneficiaries. To help insulate against the financial ramifications of VI, Medicare could make policy 
changes to address the increased expenditures of VI, especially given that there appears to be no 
improvement in quality.  For example, making payments site-neutral so there are no price differences 
between when services are rendered in an independent practice versus a health system-owned practice 
could attenuate the financial incentives when a practice newly vertically integrates. Medicare could also 
increase the rate at which it shifts payments away from the fee-for-service model and towards alternative 
payments. Despite the myriad payment reform efforts to pay for value, most health systems are paid on a 
fee-for-service basis.23 Instead, increased use of population-based payments, such as capitation, would 
remove the volume incentive in FFS. In addition, population-based payment methods would remove the 





 This study has several limitations. First, the OneKey database may not capture practice ownership 
completely accurately. Such measurement error would attenuate the estimated effects of VI on quality, so 
the results presented here would be conservative. Second, integration is more complex than a binary 
classification. There are many important dimensions of integration, of which ownership is only one.  
These include structural, functional, normative, interpersonal, and process dimensions,29 and health 
systems vary considerably along each.23 However, ownership is one important and salient characteristic 
that affects care delivery directly and thus merits study. Third, I only consider a relatively small set of 
claims-based quality measures in this study. It is possible that other important quality measures not 
captured in claims, such as patient-reported outcomes or provider satisfaction, may respond to VI. 
However, the claims-based quality measures included in this study are frequently used in performance 
improvement initiatives and relate directly to care coordination and primary care quality, which represent 
the primary proposed benefits of VI.  
3.5 Conclusions 
 In this study, I find that primary care practice VI does not affect most quality measures analyzed 
for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. However, I find evidence that mammography rates increase 
and rates of follow-up care after hospitalization decrease following VI, both of which may reflect the 
incentives toward higher-margin care faced by health systems in a fee-for-service payment arrangement. 
Coupled with the evidence that VI leads to increased Medicare spending28 and increased prices10, it does 
not appear that VI has lived up to the promise of reduced costs and improved quality. Given the financial 
difficulties faced by primary care practices during the coronavirus pandemic, the US may soon see a wave 
of consolidation.30 Such a wave may result in the “death knell”30 of independent practices while 
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CHAPTER 4. EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN THE EFFECTS OF PRIMARY CARE 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION ON OUTCOMES FOR MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
BENEFICIARIES 
4.1 Introduction 
 Previous chapters focused on overall average effects of primary care practice vertical integration 
(VI) on Medicare fee-for-service beneficiary outcomes. However, these effects may mask heterogeneous 
effects by practice characteristics. That is, some types of practices may benefit more from, and respond 
differently to, joining a health system. The goal of this chapter is to examine whether VI affects 
beneficiary outcomes differently for certain types of practices. 
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
 As with previous chapters, this chapter follows a similar conceptual framework. Briefly, the 
vertical integration of physician practices and hospitals changes their utility functions and budget 
constraints such that resources are shared across settings, and outcomes are jointly considered. From the 
practice perspective, VI is one strategy to gain access to capital and infrastructure of the more well-
resourced health system. These resources may allow primary care practices to adopt advanced care 
capabilities such as the use of electronic health records systems and other health information technology 
systems, new care management and care coordination activities, enhanced patient access to care, and 
improvements in comprehensiveness and care continuity. It is believed that care redesign and the 
inclusion of advanced care capabilities, such as those incentivized by various patient-centered medical 
home initiatives, will lead to better care and reduced spending.1,2 Before pursuing VI, practices may differ 
on the extent to which they have adequate resources to already provide advanced care services.  If that is 
the case, there may be variation in changes in outcomes following VI since practices may have already 
adopted many of the capabilities that VI might enable. In this chapter, I consider four characteristics of 
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practices that may lead to differences in levels of capabilities and thus may moderate the relationship 
between VI and Medicare beneficiary outcomes: practice size, horizontal ownership, rural location, and 
participation in an ACO. 
4.2.1 Practice size 
 Practices vary in terms of the number of staff. Larger practices may be able to achieve scale 
economies, such that they can spread fixed costs across a larger number of units (visits), may benefit from 
within-practice labor specialization, and may have more use of internal quality-improvement efforts. 
Together, these factors may mean that larger practices may be more profitable, and this may enable them 
to adopt and better use care-improvement processes and capabilities. The literature linking practice size to 
spending, utilization, and quality outcomes is mixed.3 In terms of practice capabilities, previous research 
has found that smaller practices use fewer evidence-based processes related to chronic care management4 
and use fewer medical home process in general (especially related to use of EHR systems and chronic 
disease registries) and are less likely to use rapid-cycle quality improvement strategies, collect data from 
electronic records for quality measurement, and use clinical decision support systems.5 A relatively more 
recent study found that use of care management processes, quality improvement, and health information 
technology increased with practice size, and that the largest practices had higher total Medicare 
spending.6 Taken together, if VI leads to more and better use of care-improving processes, larger practices 
may stand to benefit less and therefore VI may lead to smaller changes in beneficiary outcomes relative to 
smaller practices. 
4.2.2 Horizontal integration 
 In addition to being vertically integrated, practices may be horizontally integrated -- that is, they 
are owned by an entity at a similar level of the vertical chain of production. In the case of primary care 
practices, this would mean they are owned by an entity that owns other physician practices as part of a 
medical group. In addition to economies of scale owing to their size, medical groups may also achieve 
economies of scope, which refers to productive efficiencies when sharing inputs (e.g., sharing HIT or 
practice management).7 Previous literature has found that practices in medical groups use more quality-
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aligned care delivery processes8 and more advanced HIT capabilities.9  In addition, medical groups 
provide more services geared towards the care of complex, high-need patients and participate more 
frequently in quality-focused payment programs.10 So, practices that are already horizontally integrated in 
a medical group may stand to benefit less from VI, and therefore VI may lead to smaller changes in 
beneficiary outcomes relative to practices that are completely independent prior to VI. 
4.2.3 Rural location 
 Practices located in rural areas may not have the financial and operational resources needed to 
provided advanced care capabilities. Rural practices are much less likely get patient-centered medical 
home certification, have fewer medical home capabilities, and have fewer health IT meaningful use 
elements.11 So, rural practices may benefit more from VI than urban practices, and changes in outcomes 
may be larger for beneficiaries of these practices relative to those in urban practices. 
4.2.4 Accountable care organization (ACO) participation 
 A fourth dimension of potential heterogeneity in outcomes is accountable care organization 
(ACO) participation. ACOs reward participating providers for improving outcomes (typically related to 
cost and quality) for a defined patient population. Practices in ACOs may adopt care-improving strategies 
and processes in order to succeed under such a payment model. Previous research has found that practices 
in ACOs use physician performance data for quality-improvement efforts.12 Beyond care-improving 
processes, ACO participation may affect the incentives of vertically integrated practices. In this study, I 
focus particularly on participation in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) which is the largest 
Medicare ACO program.  MSSP rewards ACOs with higher quality performance and reduced total 
Medicare spending for a population of fee-for-service beneficiaries. Previous research has found that 
MSSP leads to small reductions in spending and small to moderate improvements in quality of care.13,14  
So, MSSP participation may lead to the use of new care delivery strategies and may affect the underlying 
incentives of practices towards reduced spending and improved quality, which together may attenuate the 





 The data used in this chapter are the same as those used in previous chapters. Briefly, I use 
longitudinal data on Medicare beneficiaries and their primary care practices over the period 2012-2017, 
all of which were derived from the Dartmouth Comparative Health System Performance Initiative Center 
of Excellence, funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.15 
4.3.2 Outcomes 
 Based on the findings from previous chapters, I selected a subset of outcome variables to explore 
heterogeneity by practice characteristics. These measures cover the range of care settings (e.g., hospital, 
physician office). The quality measures are those related to care coordination, one of the core mechanisms 
through which VI is supposed to affect care. Specifically, I analyze the following outcomes: total 
spending, acute hospital care spending, E&M spending, SNF spending, hospital admissions, outpatient 
ED visits, E&M visits, SNF admissions, 30-day hospital readmissions, and follow-up visits with PCP 
after medical discharge. 
4.3.3 Practice characteristics 
 I use data from several sources to characterize practices. I use IQVIA OneKey to categorize 
practices based on the number of clinicians (physicians, NPs, and PAs). I create categories of practice size 
based on the quintiles of the distribution of the number of clinicians in each practice at baseline (2012). 
The categories are: < 3 clinicians, 3 clinicians, 4 clinicians, 5-7 clinicians, and 8+ clinicians.  
 Practices are considered to be part of a medical group if they have an owning entity at baseline 
that also owns other physician practices and does not own a hospital. 
 Using the zip code of the practice locations cross-walked to county FIPS codes, I categorize 
practices based on Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (RUCCs). Specifically, I consider RUCC < 4 to be 
urban and RUCC ≥ 4 to be rural. 
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 Finally, I use the MSSP provider roster files in each year to determine when individual clinicians 
participate in the MSSP. I consider a practice to be participating in MSSP in a given calendar year if at 
least 1 clinician participated in the program. 
4.3.4 Covariates 
 As with previous chapters, I control for a number of beneficiary and time-varying practice 
characteristics. Beneficiary covariates include age, gender, dual eligibility, disability status as original 
reason for Medicare eligibility, HCC score, race/ethnicity, indicator for whether beneficiary lives in a 
high poverty census tract, indicators for several conditions (AMI, stroke, hip fracture/dislocation, unstable 
angina and other acute ischemic heart disease, CHF, COPD, diabetes, ESRD, cancer). Practice 
characteristics include the number of physicians, number of nurse practitioners, number of physician 
assistants, and percent of clinicians within the practice participating in the MSSP. 
4.3.5 Statistical analysis 
 The analyses in this chapter follow the same general set-up as in previous chapters. Briefly, I 
exploit the staggered timing of changes in practice ownership to study the effects of VI on beneficiary 
outcomes. I do this using an event study regression specification, which traces the evolution of effects 
leading up to and after VI. This chapter re-estimates the same regression models, but this time adds an 
interaction for each practice characteristic and the full set of event study relative time indicators.  
 The regressions are indexed by beneficiary i in practice j and time t, and include a vector X of 
beneficiary characteristics and vector P of time-varying practice characteristics. The models also include 
coefficients 𝛽𝑘 and 𝜏𝑘 which represent the event study indicators and correspond to the number of years 
relative to the calendar year in which a practice vertically integrates (denoted 𝑇𝑗). The models also include 
hospital referral region-by-year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡) effects and practice fixed effects (𝛾𝑗).  
The model is similar to the one used in previous aims but is generalized to account for 
heterogeneity by including the parameters denoted with a superscript. In the first model for heterogeneity 
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by practice size, 𝛽𝑘
𝑠  represents the pre-VI effects for each practice size category separately whereas 𝛽𝑘 
represents the pre-VI effects overall. The model for practice size heterogeneity is given by equation 1: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘
−2
𝑘=−5























𝑠 coefficients are the interaction between each VI relative time indicator and practice 
size categories and represent the moderating pre- and post- VI effects of each practice size category 
relative to the smallest category (< 3 clinicians), respectively. 
 Similarly, the regression model for heterogeneity by medical group ownership is given by 
equation 2: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘
−2
𝑘=−5


















∗ [1(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑘) ∗  𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑗] + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑷𝒋𝒕𝜷 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡  (2)
 
  
The regression model for heterogeneity by rural practice location is given by equation 3:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘
−2
𝑘=−5


















∗ [1(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑘) ∗ 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙] + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑷𝒋𝒕𝜷 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡  (3)
 
 
 The model for MSSP heterogeneity is further generalized to account for the fact that practices 
may enter the MSSP at different times. To account for these changes, I estimate a model with parameters 
for the main VI effects (𝛽𝑘 and 𝜏𝑘), the moderating effect of participating in the MSSP (𝛽𝑘
𝑎 and 𝜏𝑘
𝑎) which 
includes a binary variable for those practices that ever joined MSSP relative to those that did not 





).  In model 5 I also remove the small number of practices that participated in MSSP in baseline 
(2012) to ensures there exists some pre-MSSP time for all cohorts of MSSP-joiners. 
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𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘
−2
𝑘=−5




























∗ 1(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑗,𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑃 = 𝑘)
 
+ 
𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑷𝒋𝒕𝜷 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡  
                                                                                                                                                                                          (4)
 
 
This model assumes practices that ever join a MSSP ACO are different than those do not, and assesses 
whether VI differentially affects those two groups of practices, while accounting for a main effect of 
MSSP participation for those who did join over the study period. 
 All regressions were estimated using ordinary least squares, with standard errors clustered at the 
practice level. As with previous chapters, I use the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure on all post-VI 
coefficients to control the false discovery rate at 5%. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays characteristics of practices during the baseline year of 2012. About 12% of 
practices experienced VI over the study period (2,843 out of 24,101). The practices that experienced VI 
were larger than practices that did not experience VI, both in terms of the number of attributed 
beneficiaries (555 vs. 353 on average, respectively) and physicians (6.2 vs. 4.2 on average, respectively). 
There were also geographic differences: VI practices were more likely to be located in the East North 
Central, Middle Atlantic, and Pacific census divisions. There were no differences by urban/rural county 
location. However, within the overall urban-rural status, practices that experience VI were more likely 
located within small and medium metro areas and less likely located in large metro areas, relative to 















n=21,258   
Characteristic Mean (SD) 
Standardized 
difference 
Attributed beneficiaries 555.706 (729.69 353.690 (551.64) 0.312 
Physicians 6.248 (16.35) 4.196 (9.45) 0.154 
Nurse practitioners 0.707 (1.32) 0.685 (1.51) 0.016 
Physician assistants 0.622 (1.46) 0.545 (1.25) 0.057 
Clinicians participating in MSSP 0.099 (0.26) 0.063 (0.20) 0.152 
Physicians participating in MSSP 0.109 (0.28) 0.072 (0.23) 0.143 
n (%) 
Family Practice 1140 (40.1) 9664 (45.5) 0.176 
General Practice 256 (9.0) 1415 (6.7) 
 
Internal Medicine 604 (21.2) 4404 (20.7) 
 
Multispecialty 356 (12.5) 2653 (12.5) 
 
Pediatric Medicine 92 (3.2) 979 (4.6) 
 
Primary Care 395 (13.9) 2143 (10.1) 
 
<=2 clinicians 670 (23.56) 8215 (38.64) 0.362 
3 clinicians 439 (15.44) 3352 (15.76) 
 
4 clinicians 339 (11.92) 2351 (11.05) 
 
5-7 clinicians 653 (22.96) 3733 (17.56) 
 
8+ clinicians 742 (26.09) 3607 (16.96) 
 
East North Central 556 (19.55) 2806 (13.25) 0.292 
East South Central 155 (5.45) 1715 (8.08) 
 
Middle Atlantic 534 (18.78) 3146 (14.83) 
 
Mountain 137 (4.81) 1522 (7.17) 
 
New England 168 (5.90) 986 (4.65) 
 
Pacific 271 (9.53) 2930 (13.81) 
 
South Atlantic 577 (20.29) 4596 (21.67) 
 
West North Central 187 (6.57) 1046 (4.93) 
 
West South Central 258 (9.07) 2455 (11.57) 
 
Never join MSSP 580 (20.40) 7775 (36.57) 0.364 
Join MSSP during study period 2263 (79.59) 13483 (63.42) 
 
Urban county 2334 (82.09) 17400 (82.06) 0.001 
Rural county 509 (17.90) 3802 (17.93) 
 
Metro area of 1 million population or more 1392 (48.96) 11054 (52.14) 0.106 
Metro area of 250,000-1,000,000 population 686 (24.13) 4243 (20.01) 
 
Metro area of fewer than 250,000 population 256 (9.00) 2103 (9.92) 
 
Urban population > 2,500, adjacent to metro area 301 (10.59) 2256 (10.64) 
 
Urban population > 2,500, not adjacent to metro area 159 (5.59) 1117 (5.27) 
 
Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population 49 (1.72) 429 (2.02)   
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4.4.2 Regression results 
 For 3 of the practice characteristics considered, there was little to no heterogeneity in any of the 
outcomes analyzed (practice size, horizontal ownership, MSSP participation). The full regression results 
are presented in Appendix C. Table C.1 displays the regression results for the practice size heterogeneity 
analysis. The coefficients represent the effect of VI in each practice size category relative to the effect of 
VI for the smallest practices (those with < 3 clinicians) in each relative time period. There were very few 
differences in post-VI effects by practice size. Although not statistically significant, some differences 
were fairly large in magnitude, such as the coefficient on 4-clinician practices four years after VI ($371 
greater total spending on average than the smallest practices, 95% CI:-213, 957). Table C.2 displays the 
regression results for the medical group heterogeneity analysis. The coefficients in this table represent the 
effect of VI for practices that were already owned by a medical group prior to VI relative to practices that 
had no owning entity at all. There were few differences in the post-VI effects by medical group ownership 
other than lower SNF spending effects 1 year after VI (-$61, 95% CI: -109, -13). Table C.3 displays the 
MSSP heterogeneity results. There were no statistically significant differences in the effect of VI for 
MSSP-participating practices. 
 Some of the VI effects were moderated by rural practice location. Table C.4 displays the 
regression results for the rural practice location heterogeneity analysis. The coefficients in this table 
represent the effect of VI in rural practices relative to urban practices in each relative time period. Based 
on these models, there were some differences in the post-VI effects among spending measures. The effect 
of VI on total Medicare spending was $182 lower for rural practices than urban practices 3 years after VI 
(95% CI: -364, -1). The effect of VI on hospital spending was $62 lower for rural practices in the year 
after VI (95% CI: -120, -5). The effect of VI on E&M spending was $22 lower for rural practices in the 
year after VI (95% CI: -39, -4), and $49 lower 4 years after VI (95% CI: -85, -14). While these were the 
only statistically significant coefficients, the VI effect was lower in rural practices than for urban practices 
in each post-VI period for total spending, hospital spending, and E&M spending.  
 
62 
 The heterogeneity identified in rural practices, combined with the consistent negative effects in 
the post-VI period, warrant further investigation. The regression coefficients in Table 4 represent the 
difference in VI response in rural practices relative to urban practices, rather than the main rural and 
urban effects separately. Using the regression output, I collected the main effects for practices in urban 
areas and their confidence intervals (i.e., the main effects on the non-interacted relative time indicators) 
for the following outcomes: total spending, hospital spending, and E&M spending. I then collected the 
main rural effects by calculating for each outcome and each relative time period the linear combination of 
the relative time-by-rural interaction and the main urban effects. Standard errors and confidence intervals 
were generated using the delta method.  
 Figures 1 through 3 below display the heterogeneity results for the three selected outcomes based 
on rural or urban practice location. Total spending was not affected for beneficiaries attributed to rural 
practices, whereas spending increased following VI for those in urban practices (Figure 1). Similarly, 
hospital spending increased slightly for beneficiaries of rural practices following VI through the effects 
were not statistically significant, whereas hospital spending increased for those in urban practices (Figure 
2). Finally, E&M spending largely did not change for beneficiaries of rural practices, while those in urban 
practices experienced increases in E&M spending (Figure 3). Notably, there were no differences in the 
effect of VI on E&M volume for rural practices, suggesting a differential role of the outpatient facility fee 
for services rendered in urban practices relative to those in rural practices. This is explored more in the 
discussion. 
It is also worth noting that the confidence intervals are fairly wide in general and particularly 
wide for rural practices, so many of the rural-urban differences in effects are not statistically significant, 









Figure 4.2. Rural-urban heterogeneity regression results, hospital spending 
 





 In this chapter, I found little evidence of heterogeneity across practice characteristics. 
Specifically, there was no evidence of heterogeneity by practice size, horizontal integration before 
vertical integration, or by MSSP participation. There was, however, some evidence of heterogeneity in 
spending measures by rural-urban practice location. The VI effects were attenuated in rural practices for 
total, hospital, and E&M spending. 
 The finding of a differential response to VI in rural and urban areas is novel and has potential 
policy implications. That VI did not change spending in rural practices may be explained by the difficulty 
of changing provider behavior in rural areas. First, this could be due to limited mobility of patients to seek 
additional or new sources of care, relatively less availability of healthcare services in those areas, and/or 
the ability of small rural practices to change how they deliver care. Second, independent practices 
acquired by hospitals can convert to an outpatient department to bill Medicare for an additional facility 
fee. This requires action by the health system to attest that the acquired practice meets certain criteria for 
becoming a “provider-based entity”, including distance from the owning hospital. The observed pattern of 
increased E&M spending in urban areas but no change in rural areas, combined with no differences in 
E&M volume across these areas, suggests that perhaps rural practices are not converted into hospital 
outpatient departments at the same rate as urban practices. Third, rural practices may already be paid 
differently by Medicare. That is, many of these practices may be designated as a Rural Health Clinic or 
Type II Critical Access Hospital which would both lead to higher reimbursements for their services. 
Higher baseline reimbursement levels would reduce the potential change in unit prices when one of these 
practices are purchased by a health system. Finally, the different patterns in rural and urban areas may be 
explained by the types of hospitals acquiring these practices and the motivation for doing so. It could be 
the case that rural practices are purchased by out-of-market hospitals, as was found in previous research.16 
In this case, the hospitals may pursue rural practice acquisitions to expand their geographic footprint and 
generate referrals to their hospitals and specialists. The owning health system may be less concerned with 
the extra revenue it can get by converting the practice to an outpatient department and more concerned 
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with the referrals it can generate. In contrast, hospitals may pursue acquisitions of practices in their local 
urban markets as a way to foreclose rivals since these areas tend to have more healthcare providers and 
have higher levels of competition. The rural-urban dynamics of health system integration have been 
ignored by most previous research and merit future study, particularly as it relates to differences in 
motivation for both practices and hospitals in pursuing acquisitions within and between rural/urban areas.  
 There are several potential explanations for the overall lack of heterogeneity across most practice 
characteristics. First, it could be that VI does not substantially alter provider behavior in a way that would 
affect the outcomes considered in the analyses. Proponents suggest VI is one way for practices to gain 
access to necessary resources to improve and expand capabilities, and that these changes in care delivery 
will lead to lower costs and better care. The practices that theoretically might be in most need of those 
resources do not appear to have different outcomes (e.g., the smallest practices). So, it could be the case 
that VI does not lead to an improvement in care delivery and care capabilities as promised. Second, VI 
might simply be a mechanism for health systems to use integration for their own purposes, rather than a 
resource for practices. That is, many proponents of VI suggest that integration will lead to an increase in 
resources for practices. Instead, health systems might be focused solely on specific strategic reasons for 
pursuing VI, including as a way to gain market power and/or as a way to foreclose rivals (i.e., to deprive 
rival systems of patient referrals). Taken together, more research is needed on the motivation for practices 
and hospitals pursuing VI, documenting any changes in care delivery within practices, and correlating 
both motivations and detailed changes in care with patient outcomes.  
 The findings from this study should be considered in light of the limitations. First, OneKey may 
measure ownership with error, so the regression coefficients would be biased towards 0. Second, 
ownership is only one important dimension of integration. Others include structural, functional, 
normative, interpersonal, and process integration.17 However, ownership is a salient characteristic and 
affects care delivery decisions so it is important to study. Third, I consider a fairly limited set of 
characteristics that may moderate the effects of VI, and they may not completely capture the full range of 
heterogeneity. For example, I only consider whether a practice participates in the MSSP but a fuller 
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accounting of all of the ACO contracts they have may better capture heterogeneity. In addition, there are 
likely important patient and system characteristics that moderate the effect of VI, such as sicker or higher 
cost patients potentially benefitting more from VI or due to differences in acquiring system size and 
complexity. Future research should consider how VI varies along these dimensions.  
4.6 Conclusions 
 In this study, I find that primary care practice VI does not differentially affect Medicare 
beneficiaries in different types of practices. I do find evidence of heterogeneity in how VI affects 
Medicare spending for beneficiaries of rural practices relative to those of urban practices, potentially 
reflecting differences in the availability of services in rural areas relative to urban areas. This could also 
reflect the nature of the acquisitions themselves such that rural practices may be more likely to be 
purchased by an out-of-market health system that cannot realistically influence local care patterns. These 
findings warrant further research on how provider behavior changes following VI, and the extent to which 
practices actually increase their take-up of advanced care capabilities for patients rather than serving as a 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 This research focused on the effects of primary care practice vertical integration on a variety of 
Medicare beneficiary outcomes. The promise of vertical integration to reduce costs and improve quality 
of care has long been offered by proponents, yet to date there has been little evidence demonstrating the 
performance of vertically integrated providers. The existing evidence typically relied on cross-sectional 
associations of outcomes between integrated and non-integrated providers. Such comparisons do not shed 
light on whether changes in ownership result in changes in outcomes. In this research, I exploit changes 
in ownership over time to examine how beneficiary outcomes change once their primary care practice 
was purchased by a health system. To do this, Medicare claims data were linked to primary care clinicians 
based on the clinician responsible for the plurality of primary care services provided to a given 
beneficiary in each calendar year. Clinicians were then linked to their practice site based on the IQVIA 
OneKey database, which is believed to contain nearly the universe of healthcare providers and 
organizations in the United States. Each aim used a similar difference-in-differences design, exploiting 
the staggered timing of within-practice changes in ownership over the study period. 
 In the first aim, I found evidence that primary care practice VI leads to increases in per-
beneficiary spending. Specifically, there was evidence of increases in total annual Medicare spending per 
beneficiary of about 3%. This increase was largely driven by increased spending for hospital care and 
physician evaluation and management (E&M) services. Since spending in the Medicare program is 
generally the product of price and quantity, I was able to explore how changes in quantity influenced 
changes in spending. Following VI, beneficiaries had an increase in the number of hospitalizations and 
emergency department visits, and a reduction in the number of E&M services. That E&M spending 
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increased while E&M volume decreased illustrates the role of outpatient facility fees increasing unit 
prices for services rendered in vertically integrated practices.  
 In the second aim, I found that VI did not lead to meaningful changes in quality of care. One 
proposed mechanism through which VI changes care delivery is through care coordination, particularly 
when coordinating care after hospital discharge. To examine this mechanism, I studied whether VI led to 
changes in hospital readmissions and rates of ambulatory follow-up care following discharge. 
Readmissions, which may benefit from increased care coordination through getting patients necessary 
care in order to avert a re-hospitalization, did not meaningfully respond to VI. I expected that rates of 
follow-up care after discharge would increase following VI, as systems may have an incentive to ensure 
patients see their primary care physician during such a vulnerable time. That is, now that the practice is 
part of the system, the system would benefit financially from the additional visit billed and potentially 
through avoiding downstream complications. However, I found that follow-up care decreased following 
VI. In addition to improving care coordination, VI promises to improve primary care quality primarily 
through offloading administrative functions from the physicians to the systems as well as through 
investments in care-improving processes. To explore this mechanism, I studied how VI affects 
ambulatory care-sensitive admissions, diabetes care, and rates of mammography. There were no 
meaningful changes in any of these measures, which casts doubt on the proposed mechanisms and 
promise of VI to improve quality of care. 
 In the third aim, I explore heterogeneity of the VI effects by certain practice characteristics. VI is 
generally described as functioning like a resource for practices to improve care delivery, such as financial 
or managerial support for practices. If this is the case, practices with relatively fewer resources before VI 
stand to benefit more, and so the effects of VI may be greater for these practices than those that may 
already have many of the resources and capabilities promised by VI. In addition, some practices may have 
incentives that go against the incentives of a vertically integrated systems such as those that participate in 
an accountable care organization (ACO). Under such payment models, providers may be more concerned 
with reigning in spending so that they can benefit under the ACO. To explore these dimensions of 
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heterogeneity, I specifically examine whether VI effects differ by practice size, rural location, horizontal 
ownership before VI, and participation in the largest ACO program in Medicare, the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program (MSSP). I find no evidence of systematic heterogeneity by practice size, horizontal 
ownership, or MSSP participation. I do, however, find some evidence of heterogeneity by rural practice 
location for certain measures of spending (total, hospital, E&M) such that the VI effects of increased 
spending identified in Aim 1 are blunted in rural practices and seem to be driven by increased spending 
for beneficiaries of urban practices.  This suggests differences in practice patterns between rural and 
urban areas, and/or differences in the nature of the acquisitions occurring in these areas. 
5.2 Policy Implications 
 The findings from this dissertation have multiple policy implications. First, VI threatens the 
future trajectory of healthcare spending growth. The results of Aim 1 speak directly to spending for the 
Medicare program in particular. I found evidence of spending increases per beneficiary following VI of 
their primary care practices. Combined with the results from Aim 2, those increases in spending were not 
met with increases in quality of care. This means the Medicare program is spending more money with 
limited benefit. In addition, the spending results from Aim 1 may be a lower bound for the effects of VI 
for privately-insured patients. Private insurers pay over 200% of what Medicare pays for the same 
services, on average.1 If the care delivery patterns are similar in the privately-insured population to those I 
found in Aim 1, then the overall spending increases across payer would be substantially higher than those 
I identified for a Medicare fee-for-service population. Taken together, the Medicare program faces a 
“double-whammy”: VI leads to increased spending due to shifting patterns of utilization towards more 
expensive hospital care and away from physician services, while at the same time Medicare faces pressure 
to raise its prices for those services to keep up with rapidly increasing rates from private insurers. That is, 
as MedPAC has argued2, the relative profitability of privately-insured patients: (a) threatens access to care 
for Medicare beneficiaries, and (b) leads to negative margins on hospital care for Medicare patients as 




 Second, the finding in Aim 1 that care patterns shift towards hospitalizations and emergency 
department use and away from physician office-based care threatens the progress made by various 
delivery and payment reform efforts. These efforts, such as patient centered medical homes and 
accountable care organizations, aim to redesign care delivery while reducing costs. Providers in these 
models tend to focus on reducing expensive hospital-based care while increasing office-based care. There 
is growing evidence, both from my study and a previous study4, that VI shifts care in the opposite 
direction. In that way, vertical integration is an opposing force on progress towards achieving value in 
healthcare and changing healthcare delivery. 
 The changing patterns of care observed partly reflect the underlying incentives of vertically 
integrated health systems. That is, these health systems consider both the costs and potential for revenue 
across site of care (i.e., across hospitals and physician practices), and have an incentive to favor higher-
margin types and sites of care. But these incentives are largely driven by the fee-for-service payment 
system in which they operate. Paying for health care services in such a way incentivizes both over-
provision of care and use of higher-margin services. Under alternative payment arrangements, particularly 
those that are population-based (e.g., capitation) or bundle-based (e.g., episodic care for a particular 
service, or global budgets), vertically integrated systems may not have as strong an incentive to shift care 
towards the hospital since those services are costly and would put some of their revenue at risk.  
 Taken together, VI does not seem to live up to the promise of improved performance. From a 
policy perspective, there does not exist a single policy lever to completely address the issues of 
integration in general and vertical integration in particular. Instead, there is a constellation of different 
levers that might affect trends in integration on different margins. First, policies may aim to make VI less 
attractive to the remaining independent practices. This might include reducing reporting burden (such as 
through repealing the MIPS program), moving away from fee-for-service payment and towards 
population-based payments such as capitation (which would both provide stable revenue for practices and 
simplify billing requirements), and/or providing more opportunities for financial and technical support for 
practice transformation efforts. For example, expanding multipayer programs like the Comprehensive 
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Primary Care Initiative which offer additional care management payments to incentivize transformation 
as well as access to learning networks to disseminate best practices. Together, these options could make 
VI less attractive since they would provide similar resources to practices that VI promises to provide. 
Second, there are several important payment policy options. One such policy option would be to make 
payments completely site-neutral in the Medicare program in order to insulate it from higher prices 
resulting from VI. This would go one step further than the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, which 
grandfathered previously integrated practices and placed some limits on the distance a practice could be 
from the system hospitals, by equalizing all payments for physician E&M services regardless of whether 
they are delivered in an office or hospital outpatient department. Another option could be to cap prices in 
the commercial market, such as through the recently-proposed backstop approach to placing caps on the 
very highest prices.5 Capping commercial prices would have spillover effects to the Medicare program 
since it would alleviate some pressure on raising Medicare’s prices to keep up with private insurers. 
Finally, there are policy options aimed at enhancing competition. These could include policies aimed at 
price and quality transparency, such as requiring public data on the prices for individual services and 
quality of care outcomes. There could also be a role for federal and state antitrust regulation. While 
federal antitrust authorities have challenged horizontal integration (e.g., hospital mergers, insurer 
mergers), they have not challenged vertical mergers in healthcare for several reasons. First, the size of 
most acquisitions of physician practices by hospitals falls below reporting and scrutiny thresholds of 
federal merger guidelines.6 Second, federal antitrust agencies have historically assessed anticompetitive 
behavior through effects on pricing, and tended to view vertical mergers as being pro-competitive through 
eliminating double marginalization.7 While the vertical merger guidelines were updated in 2020, having 
previously been updated in 1984, they do not specify conditions under which authorities may scrutinize 
vertical mergers for non-price behavior, particularly in health care markets.8 Unless the thresholds and 
guidelines for scrutinizing vertical integration change, there may be a limited role for antitrust regulation 
of physician-hospital mergers.   
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5.3 Future Research 
 While the results from this study fill critical gaps in the VI literature, future research is warranted 
to more fully understand the role of VI. First, future research should explore whether VI affects other 
types of outcomes. A small number of studies have examined patient-centered outcomes, though these 
have mostly been limited to studying mortality and have used cross-sectional research designs which 
preclude causal inference.9 Future studies should also consider examining changes in patient out-of-
pocket spending, as well as patient experience. These are among the most salient and important outcomes 
to patients and merit study. Much less explored in the VI literature is how it affects provider outcomes 
such as work satisfaction. At the labor market level, increasing consolidation and integration likely means 
these systems are gaining monopsony power. Future studies should examine the extent to which this is 
occurring, and how that affects wages and wage growth for health care workers. 
 Second, while this study examined some sources of potential heterogeneity, many additional 
sources exist and merit research. For example, characteristics of the acquiring health system likely affect 
outcomes. System characteristics that may moderate the relationship between practice VI and outcomes 
might include size (e.g., number of physicians employed or hospitals owned), scope (e.g., their 
geographic footprint), and complexity. Whether VI affects different types of patients is also an under-
explored area. For example, studying whether VI improves outcomes for the sickest or highest cost 
patients merits study. Future studies should also examine the role of VI in issues around health equity and 
disparities. 
 Third, more research is needed on how VI affects primary care productivity. Based on the results 
from Aim 1, it appears that more productive PCPs may pursue VI. Qualitative research could be 
especially helpful to shed light on the nature of this dynamic and help to inform policy options for 
providing assistance to independent primary care practices (e.g., such as in the case of over-worked 
physicians pursuing VI as a way to lessen their workload). Following VI, I found evidence that evaluation 
and management services continued to decrease. Research is needed to understand exactly what is 
happening within practices. It could be that they simply see fewer patients per day, perhaps as a result of 
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new workflows or because of moving to a salaried position. It is also worth exploring whether this is an 
issue specific to Medicare or if primary care practices are less productive overall following VI. A 
particularly fruitful area of research would be to link organizational data to an all-payer claims database to 
examine how practices’ books of business change following VI. It could be the case that practices see 
fewer Medicare and Medicaid patients and more privately-insured patients since the latter may pay much 
more now that the practice can be included in the owning health systems’ insurance negotiations.  
 Fourth, the overwhelming majority of the evidence suggests that VI does not affect quality of 
care.9 Among longitudinal studies, the finding of “no change” in quality was typically estimated using 
independent providers as the comparison group. Future studies should examine whether it is the case that 
there are no changes within practices in quality-improving care processes following VI, or if there are, 
how independent practices are able to keep up. There are likely important lessons for care delivery 
redesign based on what independent primary care practices do to maintain or improve their care despite 
tending to have fewer resources compared to integrated practices. 
Finally, this study is predicated on the idea that VI serves as a resource for primary care practices. 
That is, as espoused by proponents, VI allows practices to improve care processes once they can tap into 
the capital and infrastructure of the much better-resourced owning health system. Instead, VI might 
simply be explained by any of the strategy-based theories, particularly the desire to gain market power 
and deprive rivals of referrals.10 In this way, VI can be seen as a way for health systems to exert their 
power and influence to purchase practices and gain leverage with insurers, rather than serving as a 
resource and vehicle for primary care practices to improve care delivery. As noted in a previous 
systematic review, the literature to date supports this notion, particularly that VI is primarily a way to 
foreclose rivals and secondarily a way to gain market power.10 The underlying reasons for pursuing VI 
may play out differently in rural and urban areas, as suggested by Aim 3, such that VI is pursued in rural 
areas as way to gain market power and geographic scope while it is pursued in urban areas mostly as a   
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way to foreclose rivals in those competitive markets. Future research should directly test the strategy-
based theories of VI. Such studies would shed light on the nature of VI across markets and inform policy 
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APPENDIX A. CHAPTER 2 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 
A.1 Attribution Details 
Beneficiaries were attributed to the clinician NPI who provided the plurality of their E&M 
services in a given year. These NPIs were then cross-walked directly to practices in the OneKey 
data. The specific HCPCs used were: 
 
• 99201–99205 New patient, office, or other outpatient visit  
• 99211–99215 Established patient, office, or other outpatient visit  
• 99304–99306 New patient, nursing facility care  
• 99307–99310 Established patient, nursing facility care  
• 99315–99316 Established patient, discharge day management service  
• 99318 Established patient, other nursing facility service  
• 99324–99328 New patient, domiciliary or rest home visit  
• 99334–99337 Established patient, domiciliary or rest home visit  
• 99339–99340 Established patient, physician supervision of patient (patient not present) in 
            home, domiciliary, or rest home  
• 99341–99345 New patient, home visit  
• 99347–99350 Established patient, home visit  
• G0402 Initial Medicare visit  
• G0438-G0439 Annual wellness visit, initial or subsequent 
• G0463 (replaces 99201-99215 in 2014) 




A.2 Outcome Variable Specifications 
Measure Definition 
Cost measures 
Total cost of care Sum of Medicare payments for all services in a given year 




Payments for ED visits not resulting in inpatient admission 
Outpatient facility Revenue center payments (calculated rev_pmt) for 
outpatient facility (Outpatient [OP]) using CPT codes 
grouped by BETOS or revenue center codes 0004-0242, 
0490-0500, 0550-0571, 0650-0889 
Physician E&M services BETOS Group evaluation and management payments. 
Payments (line_pmt, calculated rev_pmt) for evaluation 
and management (Part B [PTB], OP) using CPT codes 
grouped by BETOS or revenue center codes 0510- 0529, 
0180-0219, 0420-0459, 0750-0769,  0900-0919,  0930-
0945, 0949-0989 
Procedures BETOS Group for procedure payments. Payments 
(line_pmt) for procedures (PTB, OP) using CPT codes 
grouped by BETOS or revenue center codes 0360-0379, 
0820-0835 
Imaging BETOS Group for imaging payments. Payments (line_pmt, 
calculated rev_pmt) for imaging (PTB,OP) using CPT 
codes grouped by BETOS or revenue center codes 0320-
0329, 0340-0341, 0350-0359, 0400-0409, 0610-0619 
Tests BETOS group for tests payments. Payments (line_pmt, 
calculated rev_pmt) for diagnostic testing using CPT 
codes grouped by BETOS or revenue center codes 0300-
0319, 0460-0489, 0730-0749, 0920-0929 
SNF/rehab Payments for skilled nursing or rehab facility admissions 
Utilization measures 
Hospital admissions Number of admissions to acute care hospitals and critical 
access hospitals 
Number of outpatient ED visits Number of ED visits not resulting in hospital admission 
Number of ambulatory visits Number of ambulatory E&M visits (regardless of site) 
 
81 
Number of ambulatory visits in 
outpatient facilities 
Number of ambulatory E&M visits from the outpatient file 
only 
Number of admissions at 
Skilled Nursing/Rehab facilities 
Number of admissions to skilled nursing or rehabilitation 




A.3 Analysis of Beneficiary Selection 
Figure. Standardized differences in beneficiary characteristics over time, comparing beneficiaries 











Table A.1. Beneficiary event study regression results 
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Numbers represent regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Standard errors clustered by practice. Significance levels corrected for multiple hypothesis testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure. 






A.4 Geographic Adjustment to Spending Measures 
Table A.2. Spending regression results using geographic adjustment method 
 Total spending Acute care 
hospital spending 
Outpatient ED Facility 
outpatient 
E&M services Procedures Imaging Tests SNF 
4 years 
before VI 
-93.440** -45.637** -0.348 -0.322 -8.229* -5.846 -1.139 3.832 6.154 
 [-164.335,-22.545] [-76.280,-14.995] [-2.383,1.687] [-0.707,0.063] [-15.945,-0.513] [-16.340,4.648] [-7.194,4.915] [-0.459,8.124] [-22.244,34.552] 
          
3 years 
before VI 
-56.886* -33.386* 0.501 -0.229 -5.137 -7.250 -1.593 -0.373 8.180 
 [-112.145,-1.627] [-59.413,-7.359] [-0.978,1.980] [-0.570,0.112] [-11.620,1.347] [-16.433,1.934] [-6.936,3.750] [-4.078,3.333] [-13.880,30.239] 
          
2 years 
before VI 
-17.960 -8.580 -0.133 -0.006 -5.586* -2.039 0.534 0.182 -4.604 
 [-60.965,25.044] [-28.733,11.573] [-1.241,0.975] [-0.256,0.243] [-10.861,-0.312] [-9.738,5.660] [-3.328,4.396] [-2.613,2.978] [-22.323,13.115] 
          
Year of VI -16.852 -1.026 1.549** 0.449** -1.850 -2.124 5.874** -3.273* -17.388* 
 [-57.437,23.732] [-20.666,18.613] [0.464,2.634] [0.170,0.728] [-7.034,3.334] [-9.071,4.823] [1.677,10.071] [-5.777,-0.769] [-32.031,-2.745] 
          
1 year after 
VI 
25.050 17.873 1.978** 0.804*** 4.240 1.672 9.897*** -3.589* -10.760 
 [-24.463,74.563] [-5.063,40.810] [0.499,3.457] [0.432,1.177] [-2.490,10.970] [-7.308,10.651] [4.139,15.655] [-6.627,-0.552] [-30.208,8.688] 
          
2 years after 
VI 
99.214* 63.538* 1.837* 0.732** 5.022 -3.323 17.257*** -2.598 16.864 
 [1.927,196.501] [9.698,117.378] [0.007,3.668] [0.291,1.173] [-2.570,12.614] [-15.223,8.577] [9.444,25.069] [-7.709,2.514] [-44.840,78.567] 
          
3 years after 
VI 
158.009*** 72.486*** 4.375*** 0.458 30.310*** 2.233 15.189*** 3.463 4.906 
 [80.700,235.319] [37.525,107.448] [2.011,6.739] [-0.137,1.052] [16.043,44.576] [-11.195,15.662] [6.736,23.642] [-0.854,7.781] [-21.800,31.612] 
          
4 years after 
VI 
233.321*** 88.076** 3.918* 0.939* 34.373*** 1.781 6.732 -1.720 20.367 
 [118.248,348.394] [34.925,141.228] [0.764,7.073] [0.202,1.675] [15.969,52.776] [-15.253,18.814] [-3.888,17.352] [-7.074,3.635] [-19.225,59.959] 
Observations 52973198 52973198 52973198 52973198 52973198 52973198 52973198 52973198 52973198 
Numbers represent regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table A.3. Event study regression results using total standardized spending. 
 Total standardized 
spending 















Year of VI -16.996 
 [-60.616,26.624] 
  
1 year after VI 21.606 
 [-32.731,75.943] 
  
2 years after VI 131.897 
 [-10.514,274.307] 
  
3 years after VI 195.471*** 
 [108.136,282.806] 
  
4 years after VI 262.825*** 
 [127.720,397.929] 
Observations 53054584 
Numbers represent regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets 




APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 3 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 
Table B.1. Outcome measure specifications 
Measure Specification 
30-day readmission Unplanned readmissions occurring within 30 days 
of an acute hospital discharge with either a 
medical or surgical MS-DRG 
Ambulatory follow-up visits within 14 days of 
discharge, any specialty 
Beneficiary has at least one ambulatory visit with 
any clinician within 14 days of hospital discharge 
to home. In cases of multiple inpatient stays for a 
beneficiary, one hospitalization was selected as 
the index.  
 
Ambulatory visits were defined following the 
HEDIS definition using CPT codes 99201-
99205,99211-99215, 99241-99245, 99341-99345, 
99347-99350, 99381-99387, 99391-99397, 
99401-99404, 99411-99412, 99420,99429; 
HCPCS G0402, G0438, G0439, G0463, T1015; 
ICD10CM codes Z00.00-01, Z00.121, Z00.129, 
Z00.5, Z00.8, Z02.0-6, Z02.71,Z02.79, Z02.81, 
Z02.83, Z02.89, Z02.9, V20.2; and UB revenue 
codes 0510-0523, 0526-0529, 0982-0983 
Ambulatory follow-up visits within 14 days of 
discharge, PCP 
Beneficiary has at least one ambulatory visit 
specifically with a primary care physician within 
14 days of hospital discharge to home. In cases of 
multiple inpatient stays for a beneficiary, one 
hospitalization was selected as the index. 
 
Primary care was defined using specialty codes of 
the billing provider: 01 (General Practice), 08 
(Family Practice), 11 (Internal Medicine), 37 
(Pediatric Medicine), 38 (Geriatric Medicine) 
Ambulatory care sensitive admission AHRQ PQI 92 Prevention Quality Chronic 
Composite. Admissions with any of the following 
primary diagnoses: one or more diabetes short-
term complications, one or more diabetes long-
term complications, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease or asthma in older adults, 
hypertension, congestive heart failure, angina 
without procedure, uncontrolled diabetes, asthma 
in younger adults, and lower-extremity 
amputation among patients with diabetes. 
Diabetes – HbA1c test Diabetic beneficiaries aged 18-99 who had 
hemoglobin A1c test, identified using CPT codes 
83036, 86037 and CPT II codes 3064F, 3047F 
Diabetes – Eye exam Diabetic beneficiaries age 18-99 who had a retinal 
or dilated eye exam by an eye care professional 
(optometrist or ophthalmologist) in each 
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measurement year, or a negative retinal exam (no 
evidence of retinopathy: ICD-9 codes 250.50-
250.53, 362.01-362.07) by an eye care 
professional in the year prior to the measurement 
year. 
Diabetes – Blood lipids screening Diabetic beneficiaries age 18-99 who had blood 
lipids test, identified by CPT codes 80061, 83700, 
83701, 83704, 83715, 83716, 83721; CPT II 
codes 3048F, 3049F, 3050F. 
Mammogram Female beneficiaries age 50-74 as of December 
31 in the measurement year with full Part B 
eligibility and no HMO enrollment in the 
measurement year or prior year who had a 
mammogram defined as any, but only one 
occurrence during measurement year or prior year 
of: CPT codes: 76090-76092, 76083, 77055-
77057, G0202, G0204, G0206. ICD-9 codes: 
87.36, 87.37; V codes: 76.11, 76.12. UB-92 




B.2 Regression event study plots for quality outcomes 
These plots represent the event study estimates for each outcome in probability scale. That is, the 
coefficients and confidence intervals were multiplied by 100 to interpret them as percentage point 




























APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 4 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 
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-18.132 -12.312 -21.686 -36.724 -0.005 0.006 0.147 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.007 
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95% confidence intervals in brackets 






Table C.2. Event study regression results: Heterogeneity by ownership 
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Table C.3. Event study regression results: Heterogeneity by MSSP participation 
 Total spending Acute care hospital 
spending 




















4 years before 
VI, ACO 
-115.938 -39.181 2.322 -55.983 -0.000 0.015 -0.143 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 
 [-383.534,151.658] [-188.072,109.709] [-21.075,25.720] [-138.479,26.513] [-0.010,0.010] [-0.000,0.030] [-0.425,0.139] [-0.009,0.004] [-0.024,0.007] [-0.017,0.007] [-0.036,0.029] 
            
3 years before 
VI, ACO 
-83.957 -30.226 1.783 -0.930 0.000 0.000 -0.063 -0.001 0.002 0.006 -0.005 
 [-252.175,84.261] [-106.271,45.820] [-16.092,19.658] [-68.315,66.455] [-0.005,0.006] [-0.008,0.009] [-0.282,0.155] [-0.005,0.004] [-0.007,0.011] [-0.001,0.013] [-0.025,0.015] 
            
2 years before 
VI, ACO 
-29.172 -11.360 -0.939 -7.172 0.000 0.000 -0.036 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.008 
 [-137.218,78.874] [-60.502,37.782] [-13.166,11.288] [-54.044,39.699] [-0.004,0.005] [-0.006,0.006] [-0.144,0.071] [-0.003,0.004] [-0.011,0.007] [-0.006,0.006] [-0.008,0.024] 
            
Year of VI, 
ACO 
32.554 9.258 -1.457 15.018 0.002 -0.001 -0.040 0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.006 
 [-74.273,139.382] [-46.031,64.548] [-13.801,10.886] [-28.256,58.293] [-0.002,0.005] [-0.007,0.004] [-0.141,0.061] [-0.001,0.005] [-0.001,0.012] [0.000,0.009] [-0.020,0.008] 
            
1 year after 
VI, ACO 
87.457 26.542 7.109 21.917 0.002 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.007 
 [-35.272,210.186] [-33.189,86.274] [-7.037,21.255] [-28.136,71.969] [-0.002,0.005] [-0.006,0.007] [-0.096,0.142] [-0.002,0.005] [-0.007,0.009] [-0.003,0.008] [-0.024,0.010] 
            
2 years after 
VI, ACO 
123.418 54.842 6.180 76.667 0.005 -0.003 0.043 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 
 [-197.819,444.656] [-108.992,218.675] [-12.772,25.132] [-78.662,231.995] [-0.003,0.012] [-0.011,0.004] [-0.148,0.235] [-0.006,0.017] [-0.011,0.011] [-0.006,0.007] [-0.016,0.025] 







3 years after 
VI, ACO 
8.270 -29.210 -2.846 -8.858 0.002 -0.001 -0.082 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.011 
 [-178.284,194.825] [-114.555,56.136] [-35.500,29.809] [-79.250,61.534] [-0.005,0.009] [-0.011,0.008] [-0.267,0.103] [-0.004,0.006] [-0.011,0.014] [-0.011,0.007] [-0.019,0.042] 
            
4 years after 
VI, ACO 
120.531 -8.431 21.608 10.692 0.002 0.010 0.048 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.021 
 [-135.933,376.994] [-130.642,113.781] [-10.847,54.063] [-81.914,103.298] [-0.012,0.016] [-0.002,0.023] [-0.197,0.292] [-0.005,0.009] [-0.015,0.024] [-0.011,0.016] [-0.024,0.066] 
            
Observations 43879151 43879151 43879151 43879151 43879151 43879151 43879151 43879151 4349875 4349875 3285823 
            
95% confidence intervals in brackets 








Table C.4. Event study regression results: Heterogeneity by rural practice location 
 Total spending Acute care 
hospital spending 

















with PCP after 
medical 
discharge 
5 years before 
VI, rural 
-32.595 -20.856 21.095 -33.911 0.004 -0.011 0.297* -0.003 -0.012 -0.011* 0.027 
 [-217.596,152.406] [-111.794,70.082] [-3.276,45.467] [-101.717,33.895] [-0.005,0.012] [-0.027,0.006] [0.014,0.579] [-0.009,0.003] [-0.027,0.002] [-0.022,-
0.001] 
[-0.011,0.066] 
            
4 years before 
VI, rural 
130.589 55.915 15.731 9.859 0.010** 0.003 0.275* 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.010 
 [-31.302,292.480] [-18.182,130.011] [-5.518,36.981] [-47.673,67.390] [0.003,0.017] [-0.008,0.015] [0.049,0.501] [-0.005,0.006] [-0.015,0.008] [-0.010,0.007] [-0.039,0.019] 
            
3 years before 
VI, rural 
22.887 -36.599 9.905 -19.982 0.004 0.006 0.223* -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 0.002 
 [-115.924,161.698] [-100.590,27.391] [-8.631,28.442] [-67.531,27.566] [-0.001,0.009] [-0.003,0.016] [0.014,0.431] [-0.005,0.003] [-0.016,0.004] [-0.011,0.004] [-0.025,0.030] 
            
2 years before 
VI, rural 
54.885 -2.049 4.008 -9.270 0.002 0.002 0.059 -0.001 -0.009 -0.003 0.002 
 [-53.109,162.879] [-52.370,48.272] [-10.162,18.178] [-44.211,25.670] [-0.002,0.006] [-0.006,0.009] [-0.092,0.211] [-0.004,0.001] [-0.017,-
0.000] 
[-0.010,0.003] [-0.017,0.022] 
            
Year of VI, 
rural 
21.769 -17.402 -7.755 6.196 -0.002 -0.002 0.164 0.000 0.005 0.005 -0.013 
 [-90.288,133.826] [-78.934,44.130] [-22.664,7.154] [-27.498,39.889] [-0.006,0.002] [-0.011,0.007] [-0.042,0.369] [-0.002,0.003] [-0.004,0.014] [-0.002,0.011] [-0.031,0.005] 
            
1 year after 
VI, rural 
-38.078 -62.821* -22.309* 43.677* -0.005 0.000 0.284 0.003 0.007 0.006 -0.015 







            
2 years after 
VI, rural 
-172.427 -61.982 -20.574 1.916 -0.006 0.009 0.168 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.014 
 [-407.679,62.825] [-180.724,56.760] [-41.952,0.803] [-107.085,110.917] [-0.013,0.002] [-0.006,0.023] [-0.232,0.568] [-0.009,0.008] [-0.013,0.014] [-0.007,0.011] [-0.019,0.048] 
            
3 years after 
VI, rural 
-182.641* -72.410 -28.525 31.248 -0.007 0.002 0.269 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.019 
 [-364.388,-0.893] [-163.684,18.863] [-61.553,4.503] [-26.992,89.487] [-0.015,0.000] [-0.013,0.018] [-0.168,0.706] [-0.001,0.008] [-0.008,0.024] [-0.006,0.016] [-0.025,0.063] 
            
4 years after 
VI, rural 
-239.635 -74.202 -49.634** 30.460 -0.007 0.007 -0.000 0.001 0.018 0.010 0.054 
 [-529.723,50.453] [-215.789,67.385] [-85.050,-
14.218] 
[-56.349,117.270] [-0.019,0.005] [-0.017,0.031] [-0.423,0.423] [-0.006,0.009] [-0.006,0.042] [-0.004,0.025] [-0.005,0.113] 
            
Observations 53054249 53054249 53054249 53054249 53054249 53054249 53054249 53054249 5297328 5297328 3986808 
            
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
